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Abstract 
Acquisition governance currently confronts two problems: the growing size 
and complexity of systems-of-systems capabilities and the limited effectiveness of 
existing governance models to ensure the on-cost and on-schedule delivery of those 
capabilities. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is engaging in 
research on systems-of-systems acquisition governance best practices that could 
help the defense acquisition community overcome some of these problems. This 
report provides the results of several case studies illustrating the challenges of 
complex systems-of-systems acquisitions. It characterizes how existing acquisition 
governance models fall short of meeting the challenges of complex systems-of-
systems acquisition, and offers five best-practice themes meant to address those 
challenges based on the results of CSIS research and interviews with stakeholders 
in the acquisition community.  Finally, it concludes that the attributes most critical to 
success in complex acquisition efforts are level of organizational focus, decision-
making authority, and enforcement. 
Keywords: System-of-Systems, Complexity, Interoperability, Program 
Management,, Governance, Acquisition Workforce, Defense Technology 
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Executive Summary 
Over the last decade, researchers at The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) have observed the increased challenges of complexity 
in defense acquisitions. Through workshops, conferences, and publications, CSIS 
has examined how the government purchases complex systems, what challenges it 
encounters when it tries, and what key attributes of governance can be modulated to 
provide more effective acquisition. 
Building on the work CSIS and other scholars have put into understanding 
complexity, this study asks one simple question: What best practices contribute to 
better, more efficient acquisitions? To answer this question, the CSIS project team 
revisited its past work on complexity in acquisitions, analyzed new scholarship on 
the subject, and conducted detailed interviews with executives from across the 
defense acquisition community. The result of this 12-month effort is a new model of 
acquisition governance. 
In order to assess a model for complex acquisition governance, CSIS 
researchers began with the following assumptions about complex system-of-
systems acquisitions. Although these are testable assumptions, such assessments 
are beyond the scope of this study. The first assumption is that formally embracing 
complexity in acquisition efforts is necessary. This assumption allows the research 
to avoid the tautology that the best way to manage complexity is to avoid complexity. 
Complexity emerges naturally in all systems, and the focus of this paper is how 
defense acquisitions can more effectively operate within it. 
A second important assumption is that complex acquisitions share similar 
challenges that can be addressed with similar solutions. The challenges of 
complexity in one effort may appear different from those of another effort, but at its 
core the challenge of complexity is related to the unpredictability of interactions 
between systems.  
The third and final assumption is that the agency or service that is acquiring a 
defense system-of-systems—the Department of Defense, a defense service 
component, or some other federal agency—is also the lead developer of that system. 
As the research demonstrates, warfighters have turned to developing or adapting 
their own solutions to threats they encounter in-theater. Given this trend, one 
solution to acquisition challenges might be to allow end-users to innovate more 
systems. However, the focus of this paper is specifically on those systems that 
require the time and resources that only a large enough organization such as the 
Department of Defense is capable of building. 
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This report outlines best practices based on eight CSIS-developed 
governance attributes. The report concludes that three attributes in particular are 
indispensable to getting governance right. One is that acquisition leaders must 
ensure that their organizational focus is at the right level, with sufficient fluidity. The 
second is that they must delegate authority so that capabilities-level program 
managers have sufficient autonomy to select and develop sub-systems, while 
maintaining the authority to direct them toward enterprise-level objectives and 
standards. Lastly, executives should put into place enforcement mechanisms 
tailored to the specific challenges of their acquisition efforts. The report describes in 
detail associated best practices that support these three critical attributes, as well as 
the five remaining enabling attributes.
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Identifying Governance Best Practices in 
Systems-of-Systems Acquisition 
Introduction 
In this age of diverse and evolving security threats, the defense community is 
acquiring weapons, platforms, and systems with greater complexity. Here, the term 
complexity is used to describe systems-of-systems (SoS) involving multiple, 
interrelated elements that interact unpredictably. As defense products and 
capabilities become more complex, they are stressing the structure necessary for 
the acquisition of defense systems-of-systems. As a result, the acquisition 
community has encountered operational challenges in maintaining a sufficient 
engineering and acquisition workforce and process, as well as cost and schedule 
challenges. 
SoS acquisition poses considerable challenges that the current Department of 
Defense (DoD) acquisition governance structure was not necessarily designed to 
address. Increasingly, defense capabilities must support the needs of multiple users 
and must operate as horizontally integrated systems incorporating multiple individual 
platforms and programs. The high degree of interoperability and collaboration 
required for these SoS capabilities necessitates not only advanced systems 
engineering capabilities, but also advanced governance. Because the technical 
capabilities needed to achieve national defense missions have grown beyond the 
existing models of governance used to acquire them, the DoD faces challenges in 
developing, procuring, and deploying next-generation weapons and platforms. 
Furthermore, cost growth in its portfolio of accounts demonstrates that the DoD is 
encountering challenges managing cost and schedule risks associated with 
advanced and integrated capabilities.  
Attention to governance is often lacking, and the literature on this aspect 
remains relatively scarce. The acquisition community tends to address the 
challenges of complexity from a technological standpoint, with recommendations for 
improvements focusing on issues such as better knowledge management tools, 
modeling software, and systems engineering. Less common, however, is the kind of 
effective governance critical to the successful delivery of complex SoS capabilities. 
Governance ensures not only accountability and oversight over delivery, but 
determines proper resource allocation and risk assessment and management.  
The application of good governance is essential to easing complexity’s 
adverse impact on the outcomes of major acquisition efforts. As the acquisition 
community moves toward greater complexity in its major programs, schedule delays 
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and cost-overruns plague many of its Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs). This is partially attributable to risks associated with the highly 
interdependent nature of systems-of-systems and the DoD’s heavy dependence on 
developmental technologies within complex acquisition efforts. These two factors in 
particular contribute to malfunctions and failures at the sub-systems and 
components levels. Good governance facilitates effective risk management to lessen 
the impact of complexity on program outcomes. 
Good governance also helps mitigate process burdens associated with the 
DoD’s larger acquisition undertakings. The lack of a centralized management 
authority in a complex acquisition effort can create confusion among stakeholder 
agencies and contractors. It can also widen the gap between enterprise-level and 
sub-component objectives, creating a greater potential for resource misapplication 
and decreased tactical value to the warfighter. Finally, it can hinder effective 
allocation of human capital for technical and program management functions. These 
process inefficiencies can and often do impede the ability of the government to 
realize the benefits of a complex approach to acquisition.  
Given the importance of good governance within complex acquisition efforts, 
it is critical for acquisition leadership to understand and operationalize what good 
governance is. The research presented here uses the previously established CSIS 
framework of eight governance attributes to identify best practices correlated with 
the successful acquisition and delivery of systems-of-systems.  
The research analyzes two models for the acquisition of national security 
systems-of-systems: (1) the current model, in which programs-of-record (PoR) are 
acquired by an individual entity; and (2) a posited model of enterprise-wide 
coordination across multiple programs, platforms, or systems. CSIS began from the 
premise that the traditional, service-centric approach to acquisition governance may 
not be best suited to meeting the demands of managing complex acquisition efforts.  
This paper presents a case study analysis of seven acquisition efforts 
representing both the traditional and enterprise-wide governance models (see 
Table 1). In addition to the large body of literature available on each of the cases, 
the research also uses in-depth interviews with program executives and thought-
leaders in the acquisition community to extract eight descriptive governance 
attributes for each of the seven separate case studies. It summarizes those 
attributes most strongly correlated with more efficient processes and more effective 
outcomes in order to develop a best-fit model for complex acquisition governance, 
and a set of best practices for dealing with complexity in defense acquisition efforts. 
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Table 1. The Center for Strategic and International Studies SoS Governance 
Case-Study Programs 
Traditional Governance Enterprise-Wide Governance 
 Future Combat System (FCS) 
 Integrated Deepwater System 
(Deepwater) 
 
 Counter Rocket, Artillery, and 
Mortar (C-RAM) 
 Distributed Common Ground 
System (DCGS) 
 Global Nuclear Detection 
System (GNDS) 
 Harvest Hawk 
 Maritime Domain Awareness 
(MDA) 
Structure and Methodology 
This report is divided into four sections. The first section defines complexity 
and its historical roots in defense acquisition and explores problems associated with 
complex SoS acquisition efforts. The second section presents seven case studies 
for both the traditional approach to acquisition governance and its enterprise-wide 
variant. Specifically, it details the seven SoS case studies outlined in Table 1 and 
conducts cross-analysis of the selected case studies using the results of CSIS 
interviews with program executives. 
The third section presents the results of the analysis in the previous sections 
in order to construct a new model for SoS acquisition governance. It summarizes 
governance best practices using supporting evidence from specific case studies. 
In order to summarize and present a new model for SoS acquisition based on 
governance best practices, CSIS conducted this research effort in three phases: 
Phase 1: Data collection and processing of SoS governance best 
practices 
Phase 2: Data validation and analysis of findings 
Phase 3: Conclusions and visualization of key findings 
Phase 1 of this study focused on the collection of data and the processing of 
initial findings regarding best practices in SoS governance. CSIS gathered 
foundational information for this phase through a high-level review of publicly 
available literature on each of the programs and related themes, such as 
organizational behavior and program management theory. Researchers then 
conducted semi-structured in-person interviews with SoS program executives and 
systems engineers from the seven case study efforts. Other interviewees included 
SoS acquisition experts from the government and industry acquisition community not 
otherwise directly affiliated with any of the seven case studies. In the absence of 
governance data in the existing literature, these interviews served as a tool to 
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provide data for original qualitative analysis of SoS acquisition. CSIS finalized its 
initial analysis by applying its eight-attribute governance framework to the findings 
obtained during this phase. That framework is presented below: 
 Level of organizational focus: The level at which SoS governance 
occurs within the organization. This is not the same as 
systems/capabilities focus or technical focus, both of which are outside 
the scope of the CSIS SoS governance analysis. 
 Integration of functional end-user needs: The mechanisms and 
frequency with which the functional needs of end-users are built into 
the SoS, and at which points in the process of delivering the SoS this 
incorporation occurs. 
 Decision-making authority: The governance mechanisms for SoS 
delivery, including how budget is allocated, standards are set, tradeoffs 
are managed, and inconsistencies are adjudicated.  
 Enforcement: The mechanisms and level of oversight by which the 
objectives of the SoS capability to be delivered are ensured. 
 Workforce: The examination of SoS workforce structures, unity of 
mission, and contract-based capability development.  
 Incentive structure: The alignment between the enterprises goals and 
the incentive and reward structures of the individual stakeholders and 
stakeholder organizations that implement them.  
 Knowledge ownership/access to knowledge: The accessibility of 
information regarding the operating environment, technical standards, 
and the other parts of the system-of-systems.  
 Risk assessment/risk management: The degree to which risk 
assessment and management strategies are tailored to the specific 
risks of any one mission and the flexibility and resilience required for 
delivering SoS in the face of unforeseen developments. 
After the initial data collection and processing phase, CSIS conducted a thorough 
examination and analysis of the interview results in Phase 2. During this phase, 
CSIS engaged various stakeholders and experts to assist in its analysis. This phase 
concluded with the submission of this project’s first deliverable, a report outlining the 
key findings obtained through the interviews. 
This report encompasses the final stage of the study. It brings together the 
information and data compiled in Phases 1 and 2 and presents a complete series of 
governance best practices in the field of SoS acquisitions. Detailed assessments 
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and analyses of selected case studies are provided and serve as examples of both 
successful and failed SoS capability development based on the eight identified CSIS 
attributes (see above). Here, CSIS uses its framework as a flexible tool to allow for 
uniformity in its analysis of all selected SoS case studies. 
The aggregated results of this research illustrate how certain best practices in 
the three most critical attributes—level of organizational focus, decision-making 
authority, and enforcement—can make the difference between success and failure. 
Best practices in the remaining attributes also enable the efficient production and 
procurement of effective systems-of-systems, and assist mission success in large, 
complex acquisitions. 
Current Approaches to Acquisition Governance 
and the Need for a New Model 
The acceleration of technology innovation presents challenges for the 
traditional and time-tested acquisition practices of the DoD. In an effort to keep up, 
the DoD is engaging in acquisition projects and programs with increasing levels of 
complexity. In contrast to its traditional focus on individual technologies, the DoD 
uses complex systems-of-systems in order to ensure interoperability and take 
advantage of quick-moving technology areas in larger materiel projects with longer 
cycles. 
Capabilities delivered as systems-of-systems are complex by definition. 
Among other attributes, this means they consist of multiple elements typically 
developed and managed by multiple organizations. Furthermore, their constituent 
elements frequently are part of multiple capabilities—a given system may be part of 
several systems-of-systems. This poses significant management and governance 
challenges.  
Despite the difficulties inherent in complex acquisition, the payoff from 
successful delivery is the ability to achieve capabilities far greater than those 
provided by stand-alone complicated systems delivered by linear acquisition. The 
objective of the complex approach to acquisition is to allow the end-user community 
to reap the benefits of interoperable weapons and platforms and create capabilities 
multipliers through their interactions.  
Success in complex acquisition is more than an exercise in systems 
engineering and technology integration. It requires good governance. Internally, 
governance is necessary to coordinate multiple work streams and deliver various 
sets of sub-systems and components each at a different stage of technological 
maturity. Governance is also critical to the management of a system-of-systems’ 
interactions with other dynamic external systems, which not only inform the 
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technological and tactical operating environments in which the SoS capability is 
fielded, but also affect an SoS acquisition effort’s resource availability and political 
feasibility.  
Evolution of Acquisition Governance Models—Historical 
Context 
Before defining complexity and outlining the factors that have contributed to 
its emergence, it is first important to establish historical context for defense 
acquisitions and the challenges inherent in acquisition efforts.  
In the past, the government has responded to challenges in the acquisition 
environment by adjusting the division of responsibilities between itself, the customer, 
and industry suppliers. Harvey Sapolsky (2009) outlined various models of 
governance that the DoD has used in the past in a paper published by CSIS, titled 
“Models for Governing Large Systems Projects.” Sapolsky (2009) suggested that the 
government has preferred to push more of the functional responsibilities of 
acquisition away from itself and toward industry contractors over time. This is in part 
a product of the flow of human capital toward the private sector and the erosion of 
the government’s internal engineering expertise relative to industry. Although the 
elements of the Sapolsky model have different levels of analytic validity, the overall 
trends of skill and task migration from government to industry are well-documented 
and difficult to dispute. 
The original model for weapons acquisition dates back to the earliest days of 
the U.S. defense infrastructure. At that time, the U.S. Navy could specify the warship 
it needed along with the design, construction, and outfitting of the ship. The Navy 
managed and performed production operations and generated technical 
requirements at all levels of the acquisition chain. Sapolsky (2009) titled this 
acquisition approach the “Arsenal Model,” under which the government forms its 
own industrial base. It relies on scientists and engineers within the federal 
government’s defense workforce. It is still employed to an extent today through the 
DoD’s network of arsenals and maintenance depots around the country. 
An acquisition approach known as the Contract Model involves greater 
industry participation in technical execution than the Arsenal Model. This model 
became dominant with the beginning of the Cold War. Increasingly, the government 
relied on the expertise and responsiveness of contractors to meet its needs for 
larger and more technically demanding weapon systems. Over time, the government 
maintained a workforce in contracting and acquisition program governance but 
began to outsource more technical execution to industry. 
As weapons became more complex and management of these systems 
needed improvement, the acquisition community developed a preference for greater 
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industry involvement under the Weapon System Manager Model of acquisition. This 
model employs large contractors responsible for administration and coordination of a 
network of contractors working on subtasks integral to the overall acquisition effort. 
Passing responsibility to the weapon system managers has the advantage of 
involving large and responsive contractors that assist the integration of more 
complex systems that originate from a larger network of stakeholders. 
As the DoD began to manage less of the implementation and fewer program 
management capabilities, it also started to lose its ability to provide technical 
direction for its acquisition efforts. This was accelerated by the end of the Cold War, 
when technical direction became almost exclusively the purview of industry. At this 
time, DoD leadership preserved combat capabilities while seeking savings within the 
technical functions of the services. This fourth model, known as the Outsourcing 
Model, grew more prevalent due to greater preference for private sector program 
implementation over government implementation.   
The flow of more tasks and responsibility toward industry contributed to the 
growth of what Sapolsky (2009) called the “Lead System Integrator (LSI) Model” 
more commonly used today. Because LSI has been adopted to describe a specific 
type of contracting, this paper refers to Sapolsky’s LSI Model as the “System 
Integration (SI) Model.” In the SI Model, capabilities requirements are still controlled 
by military officers, but technical expertise is contracted to SIs to advance the 
capabilities of the planned weapon systems.  
As the adaptation of Sapolsky’s governance models in Table 2 indicates, the 
evolution of acquisition governance models over time—from preference toward the 
Arsenal Model in the earliest days of U.S. defense acquisition, to greater use of the 
SI Model in large weapon systems acquisition today—is characterized by the 
gradual removal of responsibility from the government buyer. In theory, moving all of 
the functions formerly performed by the government to industry contractors lessens 
the personnel burden associated with the maintenance of a large in-house 
acquisition workforce. Furthermore, reliance upon industry to designate technologies 
that meet warfighter demands is expected to facilitate the procurement and 
development of advanced capabilities in a shorter amount of time. However, this 
evolution has fallen short of expectations in practice and may instead be contributing 
to cost and schedule overruns and compromising the government’s ability to 
manage large-scale acquisition efforts. 
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Table 2. Evolution of Acquisition Governance Models 
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Note. This table was adapted by CSIS from Sapolsky (2009). 
The changing distribution of responsibilities between the industry supplier and the 
government customer, reflected in the Sapolsky model, serves to frame acquisition 
governance challenges in SoS acquisition. In addition, there are two distinct models 
for the direction of acquisition governance. In the traditional approach to acquisition 
governance, the capabilities comprising a system-of-systems are governed 
downward from the program-level. In an enterprise-wide governance approach, 
governance flows upward from the capabilities-level. Because the “enterprise 
approach” is an emerging model that is currently evolving to meet the demands of 
SoS complexity, its application is not evident in early-stage acquisition governance 
models. Instead, traditional, top-down approaches to acquisition governance have 
been most prevalent throughout the evolution of governance models, from the 
Arsenal Model at the dawn of U.S. armed services to the SI Model today.  
Complexity—The Problem Defined 
The existing governance models described above represent various ways to 
divide responsibility among customer and supplier stakeholders. These models 
illustrate how the DoD’s preferences evolved to push human capital, technical 
knowledge, and production assets away from the government and toward industry. 
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However, these models fall short of providing an effective governance approach 
when faced with the challenges of complexity. 
Within complexity theory, complex systems1 are defined as those systems in 
which multiple components interact with, and exert influence on, one another and 
the various factors in their external environments over time. This research focuses 
on complexity within SoS acquisition specifically. Therefore, this paper uses 
complexity to describe systems consisting of multiple sub-systems and components 
that are typically developed and managed by more than one organization. The 
existing literature has applied the principles of complexity theory extensively to such 
fields as economics and business management.2 This research aims to contribute to 
that body of literature by identifying best practices specific to the challenges defense 
and fed-civil acquisition managers confront in their SoS acquisition efforts. This 
focus is narrow, but as with other work that has been undertaken on complexity, its 
implications are applicable to other disciplines. 
Complexity has emerged in major defense acquisitions for a number of 
reasons. The DoD has relied on systems-of-systems to facilitate the incorporation of 
quickly developing bleeding-edge technologies in large platforms, which tend to 
develop and reach production much more slowly. The rationale for complex SoS 
acquisition over more traditional approaches also originates in DoD’s demand for 
more interoperable network operations and greater jointness among its constituent 
agencies and branches, as well as with international partners. Finally, acquisition 
leaders have invested in complex systems in order to create capabilities geared 
toward a broad range of both complementary and non-complementary requirements. 
In short, the level of complexity in DoD acquisitions has risen by default from the 
complexity of external systems (technology industries, threat environments, etc.), 
and by design out of the growing interest among defense planners to improve how 
well and in what ways the DoD satisfies its mission objectives.    
Complex systems present four related problems for defense acquisition 
planners and decision-makers. First, the conceptual size of a complex system is 
larger than a traditional system. For example, ground vehicles used in the early- to 
mid-twentieth century were treated as one product; their interactions with other 
materiel were not negligible, but those interactions could be managed on a tactical 
level post-deployment. Conversely, today’s ground vehicles contain their own sub-
                                            
1 Much literature is dedicated specifically to complex adaptive systems, or CAS. These complex 
system are particular in that their sub-systems are able to respond to interactions and influences 
from other sub-systems and the external environment to protect the integrity of the system-of-
systems. See, for example, Gell-Mann (1999). The complex systems discussed here do not 
assume that any system or sub-system is adaptive to its interactions or surroundings. 
2 For a discussion of how complexity theory has been applied in social and organizational sciences, 
see Levy (2000). 
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systems. A personnel carrier might have dozens of its own active and passive 
protection systems interacting with the vehicle and the external environment, a 
number of different communications devices, and various on-board weapons 
platforms, to name a few. Each of these systems has its own acquisition demands 
above and beyond the base requirements of the vehicle itself. 
Second, each of the sub-systems within a system, as well as the systems 
external to it, interacts with others. Some of those interactions can be forecast to 
some degree, but forecasts will have limited accuracy. Furthermore, interactions can 
produce cascading interactions and change the behavior of other subsystems or the 
system as a whole. This contributes to a third problem complexity presents, namely 
that the output of a system is not equal to the sum of its inputs. The interactions can 
create amplified or diminished outcomes. This is a driver of complexity in defense 
platforms, as the multiplying effects of complementary systems can create new and 
more advanced defense technologies. However, as with the interactions themselves, 
it is difficult to forecast the individual and aggregate results of the system and sub-
system interactions, much less to harness them for a desired outcome. 
Finally, complexity is a problem because it operates outside the boundaries of 
traditional linear approaches to acquisition governance. This is central to objective of 
this report. Traditional, risk-averse governance approaches to designing, 
engineering, developing, and procuring defense weapons and platforms are not 
adequately flexible to manage the unpredictable interactions of systems, sub-
systems, and the external environment. They create static program objectives to 
acquire dynamic technologies. Those technologies often evolve at widely different 
rates of development, and upgrading platforms with long life cycles can be difficult. 
Existing Governance Models Are Too Rigid for Complex 
Acquisition 
The inability of existing governance models to manage complex acquisitions 
effectively is apparent in the pervasive process challenges the DoD faces, as well as 
the poor outcomes of major acquisition efforts. Both of these factors are core 
indicators of the effectiveness of governance. Process is used here to refer to the 
collective operational inputs the government employs in executing projects and 
programs—labor inputs, bureaucratic requirements, and so forth. Outcome 
describes the products or services governance processes deliver, the time and cost 
required to deliver those products or services, and the alignment between the time 
and cost objectives and actual time and cost results. 
Workforce capacity and organizational hierarchy are two areas of process 
strain in the existing governance structure. As capabilities become more complex, 
they demand a DoD systems engineering workforce that may exceed what the 
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government customer can offer. Additionally, the pace of project execution under 
traditional approaches to acquisition, along with the centralization of decision-making 
autonomy in government branches—especially in the DoD—frustrates project and 
program managers’ ability to respond to resource challenges and manage 
operations autonomously.  
These process challenges can result in structural difficulties for SoS 
capabilities that may not exist in traditional acquisition approaches. For instance, 
knowledge-sharing—a straightforward task in traditional acquisition—faces new 
challenges in complex SoS acquisition efforts. Knowledge ownership and incentives 
for sharing become less clear, adding to the host of governance process shortfalls. 
Compounding these challenges in technology, operational requirements, and 
structure, the DoD organizations needed to develop and deploy the SoS capabilities 
are bigger and more difficult to manage and maintain than traditional acquisition 
organizations, particularly under the SI Model.  
The growing divide between acquisition governance models and acquisition in 
practice is also clear in SoS acquisition outcomes. Government customers’ ability to 
deliver complex SoS capabilities on cost in particular is declining. According to the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2013), more than 86 MDAPs in fiscal year 
2012 showed approximately $400 billion in aggregated cost overruns since their first 
full-year estimates, representing a 4% ($90 billion) growth in development costs and 
a 5% ($290 billion) growth in costs of procurement. As dramatic as this cost growth 
is, this latest annual report from the GAO is actually anomalous when compared 
against even greater cost growth in the 2012 report. In that iteration, 96 MDAPs 
existing in that year had grown an aggregated $447 billion in excess of their original 
estimated costs (GAO, 2012). Given the expected impact of sequestration, the 2012 
report is likely to more accurately represent the trend in cost growth. That trend is 
particularly evident when compared with the 2007 GAO report, which cited 64 
MDAPs in the DoD’s accounts that had grown at an average annual rate of 4.9 
percent. This produced a total annual cost growth of $165 billion by those programs 
in that year (GAO, 2007a). This indicates that cost overruns grew 170.9% in the 
years between 2006 and 2011.  
The government is also encountering challenges in keeping its major 
weapons programs on schedule. In its latest report, the GAO (2013) found that 
MDAPs experienced an average delay of 27 months in reaching initial operational 
capability. This figure exceeds the 2012 estimate of 23 months in average delay. 
Combined with the upward trend in cost growth over time, this track record indicates 
that existing governance and management tools no longer suffice for today’s 
complex weapon systems. 
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As cost and schedule overrun trends illustrate, delivering systems-of-systems 
depends on getting governance right. However, the traditional service-centric 
approach to acquisition governance is not sufficiently flexible to meet the needs of 
systems-of-systems. Specifically, flexibility is limited in two ways. 
First, the current process of generating requirements does not allow for the 
integration of changes in user needs. Because complex systems-of-systems are 
inherently dynamic, non-linear, and risk-intensive, acquisition leadership’s ability to 
react to changes in user needs is critical to the successful delivery of SoS 
capabilities. Structured but flexible oversight procedures improve alignment between 
DoD requirements and fielded systems by establishing clear systems-level metrics 
and measuring progress toward declared goals. Systems must also be able to 
respond to changes in external factors in order to ensure that the SoS capability is 
as relevant when it reaches the production and deployment phase as it was in pre-
acquisition phases. These factors could include macro-level changes in the security 
environment and technological advances, as well as micro-level changes in 
organizational politics and acquisition effort leadership.  
Second, successful acquisition delivery requires the “power of the purse” to 
direct solutions and approaches. In order to direct efforts toward certain capabilities, 
program leadership must be able to dedicate resources such as real contracting 
dollars, as well as human capital and allocations for other overhead costs, to certain 
system efforts. However, budgetary power is limited when individual services and 
defense agencies are the highest level of governance, due to the relatively more 
limited ability of those stakeholders to guarantee funds for the system or to be able 
to shift and reapportion them at the system-level. The process by which funds are 
secured also limits flexibility; the DoD’s 20-month-plus budget cycle that precedes 
actual appropriation may lead the DoD to acquire technologies that are bleeding-
edge when a budget is begun but that may become outdated by the time the budget 
is enacted.  
The root causes of limited flexibility in SoS acquisition efforts are themselves 
complex and reflect a variety of challenges. One major theme of problems is the 
division of authority at different levels of an acquiring organization. Systems reside in 
different programs that are designed, funded, managed, and implemented by 
different entities. Another problem with this lack of necessary authority is that no 
entity below the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics 
(hereafter, the USD[AT&L]) can make SoS decisions, which is especially important 
regarding the synchronization of capabilities across sub-systems. Other issues 
pertaining to the lack of necessary authority include the inadequate oversight and 
enforcement at the SoS level, in addition to the limited organizational ability to 
coordinate across schedule, funding, and technical areas.   
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Two other major themes of root causes are the lack of warfighter input and 
the need for DoD processes to change. Iterative warfighter input, particularly as it 
relates to end-user requirements, is insufficiently integrated into systems-of-systems.  
Many systems-of-systems possess a disconnect from warfighters’ needs even after 
SoS integration. Current DoD processes mirror the governance model that is 
stovepiped in the services and agencies that authority, budgeting, and 
implementation occur. These processes are geared toward delivery of hardware 
programs and not optimized for delivery of systems-of-systems, capabilities, or 
services. Many of these processes also underestimate the cost and complexity of a 
system-of-systems. 
Other major themes underscoring the root causes of ineffective governance 
include poor risk assessment and management, requirements prioritization, and 
communication. Risks are often not addressed beyond systems level and are often 
underestimated in their original assessments. These unrealistic assessments cause 
synchronization difficulties, which affect risk management later during 
implementation. Prioritization of requirements is another major theme in the root 
causes as requirements, which are often ambitious, are not resource constrained, 
and are subject to frequent changes, often leading to cost and schedule problems. In 
addition, the inefficient requirements process often produces programmatic 
synchronization problems. The last major theme that deals with root causes is 
communication. Insufficient communication occurs both internally and externally.  
For program leads, insufficient notification on cost and schedule slippages between 
programs often leads to distrust and inefficiencies. For end-users, insufficient 
communication on cost, schedule, and requirements also causes distrust and 
inefficiencies. 
Enterprise-Wide Governance Is Key to Success in Complex 
Acquisition 
Given the limited effectiveness of traditional service-centric approaches to 
governance in dealing with complexity, it is useful to look at new, enterprise-wide 
governance models for the acquisition and delivery of complex SoS capabilities.  
Numerous platforms and systems comprise a system-of-systems, and the 
interactions of these components are highly unpredictable. Coordination of these 
internal constituent systems is necessary to achieve the desired SoS capability, 
which otherwise would be out of reach for any single component alone. CSIS 
research suggests an enterprise-wide approach to governance would facilitate 
oversight and accountability of the systems’ individual components to achieve that 
coordination.  
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Problems associated with a service-centric approach to governance appear to 
originate in their limited resource and decision-making agility. Successful delivery of 
systems-of-systems depends on the ability to react to changes in user needs, 
external factors (including the global security environment and organizational 
politics), and technological progress. Most of all, it requires the power of the purse to 
direct solutions and approaches. But such power is nonexistent when individual 
services and agencies are the highest level of governance, and rapid reaction is 
difficult given the DoD’s 20-month-plus budget cycle and the six to 24 months 
needed to get through the requirements cycle.  
Outdated oversight mechanisms also contribute to process burdens in 
complex acquisition and negatively impact the outcomes of large DoD programs. 
The traditional approach to acquisition is geared toward more traditional, linear 
acquisition programs. Existing models were not designed to organize a diverse set 
of stakeholders around a common mission. While the DoD has attempted to bring 
new thinking to systems engineering to tackle some of the challenges of complexity, 
program management thinking remains stuck. By applying cumbersome, rigid 
oversight processes, the DoD has slowed the pace of its advanced technology 
innovation efforts and lessened its ability to realize the benefits of complex SoS 
acquisition. 
Developing new governance models requires a better understanding of 
program attributes (i.e., what the program needs in order to succeed) and of the 
elements of governance that different organizations possess. On the program side, 
additional research is needed on how funding stability, schedule stability, technology 
maturity, stability of requirements, estimated versus contracted cost, and 
management stability affect performance. On the organizational side, attributes such 
as technical awareness, project management skill, customer understanding, 
organizational longevity, manufacturing expertise, and organizational independence 
require more attention. That said, the existing governance and management tools no 
longer suffice for today’s complex programs. 
The results of CSIS research indicate that an enterprise-wide approach to 
governance may improve the DoD’s ability to understand complex acquisition efforts. 
Because complex systems-of-systems are inherently dynamic, non-linear, and risk-
intensive, they require clear directional leadership from the top. However, complex 
acquisition efforts and the organizations designed to manage them must also exhibit 
agile resource utilization from below. The enterprise model discussed in this paper 
features several attributes that CSIS research suggests contribute to resource 
agility. 
In contrast to the highly linear traditional model of governance, the enterprise 
model encourages broad and flexible authority delegation. The case studies 
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illustrate that this feature, when paired with effective directional leadership in the 
form of standards and review processes, allows stakeholders with different functions 
at different levels of the organizational hierarchy to more closely interact with one 
another and more effectively respond to changes in external systems, especially the 
complex system comprised of various environmental factors. 
An additional feature of the enterprise model that makes it ideal for describing 
the governance of complex systems is that it is more easily adapted to the 
requirements of specific organizational goals. Research illustrates that a one-size-
fits-all policy or model is not appropriate for the challenges of complexity. Literature 
on the application of complex systems theory to organizational design is nearly 
unanimous in its emphasis on informal hierarchies as opposed to global, rigid 
structures such as those encouraged by existing DoD 5000-series acquisition 
guidelines.   
Systems-of-Systems Acquisition Case Studies 
As discussed in the previous section, there is a need for a new model of 
governance in DoD efforts to develop and procure complex systems-of-systems.  
This section describes seven cases of complex acquisition, each with unique 
process challenges and outcomes. It presents research on these cases based on 
secondary data as well as interviews with program executives and leaders in the 
acquisition community. Each case is shown to have managed complexity to various 
levels of success and with different resource demands based in part on its 
performance in eight attributes of governance.  
CSIS notes that the analysis, findings, and conclusions of each of these case 
studies are entirely the product of CSIS research and may not be consistent with or 
reflect official government assessments of or data from the programs themselves.  
Overview 
CSIS developed its framework for analysis of governance in complex 
acquisitions through previous work on SoS governance. The framework is the 
product of research on SoS governance models, interviews with program 
stakeholders and industry leaders, and a findings refinement process involving input 
from SoS experts. It consists of eight attributes that collectively represent concerns, 
questions, and issues that must be addressed for an organization to succeed in 
acquiring a complex system-of-systems. The importance and significance of these 
attributes varies depending on the system to which the framework is being applied. 
The eight governance attributes are as follows: 
 Level of organizational focus: The level at which SoS governance 
occurs within the organization. This is not the same as 
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systems/capabilities focus or technical focus, both of which are outside 
the scope of the CSIS SoS governance analysis. 
 Integration of functional end-user needs: The mechanisms and 
frequency with which the functional needs of end-users are built into 
the system-of-systems, and at which points in the process this 
incorporation occurs. 
 Decision-making authority: The governance mechanisms for SoS 
delivery, including how budget is allocated, standards are set, tradeoffs 
are managed, and inconsistencies are adjudicated.  
 Enforcement: The mechanisms and level of oversight by which the 
objectives of the SoS capability to be delivered are ensured. 
 Workforce: The examination of SoS workforce structures, unity of 
mission, and capability development through use of contracting.  
 Incentive structure: The alignment between the enterprise’s goals and 
the incentive and reward structures of the stakeholders and 
organizations that implement them.  
 Knowledge ownership/access to knowledge: The accessibility of 
information regarding the operating environment, technical standards, 
and the other parts of the system-of-systems.  
 Risk assessment/risk management: Risk assessments and 
management strategies tailored to the mission accomplishment and 
the flexibility and resilience required for delivering systems-of-systems 
in the face of unforeseen developments. 
CSIS has examined relevant case studies to better understand how these eight 
attributes affect programs.  This section assesses and analyzes these selected case 
studies based on the eight CSIS attributes above to serve as examples of both 
successful and failed SoS capability developments. The application of the eight-
attribute framework will serve as a flexible tool for consistent analysis of all selected 
SoS case studies. Case studies examined are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3. The Center for Strategic and International Studies SoS Governance 
Case Study Programs 
Traditional Governance Enterprise Governance 
 Future Combat System (FCS) 
 Integrated Deepwater System 
(Deepwater) 
 Counter Rocket, Artillery, and 
Mortar (C-RAM) 
 Distributed Common Ground 
System (DCGS) 
 Global Nuclear Detection 
System (GNDS) 
 Harvest Hawk 
 Maritime Domain Awareness 
(MDA) 
These case studies are presented in alphabetical order, beginning with those 
programs that fall in the traditional model category. Each case study provides an 
overview of the program objectives, specifics about lead agency(ies) acquisition 
strategies, and a brief discussion of the program’s successes and failures. Most 
importantly, each case study presents an analysis of program characteristics with 
reference to the eight governance attributes. 
Frameworks Versus Models: From Conceptual to Concrete 
The traditional and enterprise models describe two ways to conceptualize a 
complex SoS effort, but they are insufficient in themselves to describe best practices 
in SoS governance. Instead, the models discussed in this research represent two 
paths of logic for understanding complexity. The traditional model represents linear 
logic. Scholarship on complexity shows that this kind of logic contributes to difficulty 
in understanding and dealing with complexity.3 The enterprise model, as applied 
here, incorporates the individual elements of acquisition efforts and organizes them 
in a non-linear way. Acquisition managers can use this model to visualize and 
analyze the relationship of each element to other elements. The next section 
illustrates how this approach contributes to more agile governance. 
The models are valuable only insofar as they represent two ways in which 
acquisition leaders can conceptualize their acquisition efforts within the context of 
complexity. A more concrete set of tools is necessary to organize acquisitions into 
concrete variables that can be analyzed historically and controlled in future efforts.  
                                            
3 In his book on complexity in military operations, Edward Smith (2006) wrote, “The reality is that 
dealing with the complexity is not difficult. … Rather, our difficulty stems from trying to deal with the 
nonlinearity of our complex security environment using only linear logic, metrics, and thinking” (p. 
66). This concept provides the basis for much of the scholarship on applications of complexity 
theory to economics and business management. Smith’s (2006) position is also echoed by 
literature on related theoretical frameworks, such as constructal theory, network theory, and chaos 
theory.   
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 18 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
This research uses the CSIS acquisition governance framework to 
accomplish the task of turning case analysis into concrete, functional best practices. 
Whereas the categorization of each case as either an enterprise approach or a 
traditional approach facilitates the conceptualization of complexity, the CSIS 
governance framework provides the necessary tools for dealing with it. By breaking 
down governance into key controllable components, the framework enables analysis 
of specific best practices to support mission success in complex acquisition efforts. 
Traditional Model Case Studies 
In the traditional approach to acquisition governance, a program office or a 
similar central authority mandates and governs the capabilities comprising a system-
of-systems. Linear acquisition activities follow defined user needs, typically in the 
form of broad tactical requirements. The acquisition activities begin with overarching 
technical requirements, which inform bids from government and industry suppliers. 
Program offices analyze bids for their closeness-of-fit to certain criteria and select a 
winning solution. The winning contractor then develops, produces, and deploys the 
system-of-systems (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Traditional Acquisition Governance 
 Note. This figure comes from CSIS analysis. “Acquisition Activities” was adapted from 
standard defense acquisition protocols, as outlined in DoD (2008, p. 12). 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the traditional model of acquisition governance has 
a linear form. The nature of inputs determines the output at any single stage in this 
model. The user needs to trigger a standardized acquisition process. The customer 
operates and maintains that product over its life cycle. The ability of the product to 
meet changing needs, along with other changes in the external environment, is 
limited. Those dynamics instead influence new user needs, or early-stage user 
needs being used to drive acquisition activities, which in turn result in a new round of 
acquisition. 
Linearity in an organization creates problems when the organization 
encounters the challenges of complexity. Without meaningful authority of its own, a 
lower-tier component of the acquisition hierarchy is forced to defer to higher levels of 
the linear organizational structure. As the case studies presented here illustrate, 
these long authority chains strain the ability of personnel to create new and 
innovative ways to solve external challenges. They also slow the process of 
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acquisition and widen the gap between time to product delivery and rate of new 
capabilities development in the external environment (i.e., private sector). 
The case studies identify three interrelated ways in which the linearity of the 
traditional model challenges the ability of the DoD to execute complex SoS efforts 
and to deliver capabilities on-cost and on-schedule. First, individual stages of the 
acquisition process have difficulty responding to changes in user needs and the 
external environment once these inputs have set the technical requirements. 
Second, efforts to preempt changes in those inputs often result in acquisitions of 
immature technologies with high levels of risk. Finally, as delays occur in the 
development of components of the systems, parent systems cannot adapt which 
creates setbacks. This effect can occur in any complex effort regardless of the 
model, but the structure of the traditional model of governance exaggerates this 
effect.  
CSIS analysis shows that the cases in which the traditional model of 
governance was applied were slow to react to changes in the environment and the 
evolution of new user needs. Formal, top-down authority and long-term planning 
caused fatal problems to emerge in both cases and encouraged numerous 
restructuring efforts. Finally, while executives in the acquisition cases had tried 
unique approaches to managing complexity, they were restricted by existing policy 
frameworks and acquisition guidelines into more rigid governance structures. 
Future Combat Systems 
Future Combat Systems (FCSs) was conceived as one of three substantial 
initiatives to modernize the Army. After nine years of development and with a project 
total cost of $200 billion, the Army terminated the program. The challenges FCS 
faced and the eventual cancellation of the program illustrate the importance of 
planning for system interdependency and exercising strong enforcement 
mechanisms to deliver large SoS capabilities. 
The FCS program was officially initiated with a four-team competition in February 
2000 and terminated nine years later in 2009. It initially consisted of 18 manned and 
unmanned systems linked together via a network. As the largest acquisition program 
ever attempted by the Army, FCS was envisioned to transform the service by 
replacing current systems such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley 
infantry fighting vehicle as well as by adding new capabilities.  
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Table 4. Future Combat System Governance Attributes 
Note. This table comes from CSIS analysis. 
The concept for FCS emerged out of a joint study proposed in 1999 by 
General Paul J. Kern, then the military deputy to the assistant secretary of the Army 
for research, development, and acquisition. Gen. Kern proposed to the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) a study on the future Army. The 
study advisory group found that in order to achieve Kern’s vision—to be mobile, 
lethal, survivable, and responsive—the Army needed a system-of-systems (Gorman 
& Diehl, 2003, p. B-11).  
In May 2000, DARPA awarded four contracts to four industry teams to 
develop FCS designs. The Army awarded the lead systems integrator (LSI) contract 
to a Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) team in 
March 2002 after nearly two years of design evaluation. The Boeing and SAIC team 
worked with more than 550 contractors and subcontractors in 41 states.   
In its earliest stages, the Army planned to build FCS with 18 systems, all 
linked by a single network. In May 2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 
Governance Attributes Program Characteristics 
Level of organizational 
focus 
 Narrow, program-level focus 
 Program managers paid little attention to enterprise components with 
which FCS was supposed to integrate (namely WIN-T and JTRS) 
Integration of functional 
end-user needs 
 Top-down requirements-setting based on Army Vision (1999) and 
Mission Needs Statement (2000) documents produced low integration of 
end-user needs into ongoing FCS development 
 Although mechanisms were present to integrate changing requirements, 
there is little evidence that they were used 
Decision-making authority 
 Program organized to segregate decision-making and push it downward 
o 7 SoS Integrated Product Teams (IPT) and 7 Systems product 
teams established to provide product and process oversight 
 Authority became concentrated at the Program Manager level, as the key 
component of the relationships between the LSI and oversight offices  
Enforcement 
 OSD oversight officials required revised baselines in Milestone B 
approval due to unacceptably high costs and risks, but Army’s 
reintegration of original baselines after the fact point to weak 
enforcement mechanisms 
Workforce 
 Contractor program managers act in the role of acquisition leadership 
 IPTs (product and mission offices) co-led by one appointee from the LSI, 
and one appointee from the Army 
Incentive structure 
 Performance incentives based on completion of program events (design 
reviews, etc.) rather than product performance 
 Cost incentives based on projected life-cycle cost 
Knowledge ownership/ 
access to knowledge 
 FCS exhibits significant problems with stovepiping of knowledge  
o Sub-contractors were hesitant to submit competitive information to 
the Boeing-SAIC LSI team 
o Other Transaction Agreement- (OTA) based contract limited the 
amount of knowledge the LSI was required to share initially 
Risk assessment/risk 
management 
 PM FCS and Boeing-SAIC conducted independent assessments of the 
FCS health periodically using Earned Value Management System 
(EVMS)  
 Many of the technologies selected for FCS were developmental and at 
low levels of maturity, and could not be monitored with hard metrics 
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Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics (OSD[AT&L]) required the Army to cut 
several systems in order to receive Milestone B approval. The Army reduced the 
total number of systems to 13. However, the Army reintegrated the cancelled 
systems back into FCS two years later when it conducted a re-baselining of the 
program in November 2005 (Pernin et al., 2002; see Table 5).  
Table 5. Adjustments to FCS Family at Key Program Points 
# System Acronym 2003 2005 2007 
1 Mounted Combat System MCS X X X 
2 Infantry Carrier Vehicle ICV X X X 
3 Non Line of Sight Cannon NLOS-C X X X 
4 Non Line of Sight Mortar NLOS-M X X X 
5 Command and Control Vehicle C2V X X X 
6 Reconnaissance and Recovery Vehicle RSV X X X 
7 Maintenance and Recovery Vehicle M&RV  X X 
8 Medical Vehicle MV X X X 
9 UAV Class I UAV-CL1 X X X 
10 UAV Class II UAV-CL2  X  
11 UAV Class III UAV-CL3  X  
12 UAV Class IV UAV-CL4 X X X 
13 Armed Robotic Vehicle  X X X 
14 Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment MULE X X X 
15 Non Line of Sight Launch System NLOS-LS X X X 
16 Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle SUGV X X X 
17 Intelligent Munition Systems IMS  X  
18 Unmanned Ground Sensor UGS X X X 
Note. This table was adapted by CSIS from Pernin et al. (2002). 
At the outset, the FCS family of capabilities was expected to enable a 
warfighter to assess the battlefield and control response capabilities from a manned 
command and control vehicle, the C2V. The vehicle would access and command 
other assets through the through the central network. The GAO reported in 2001 that 
the success of this concept would depend in part “upon mature technologies to allow 
the Army to design secure networks that cannot be jammed or taken over by the 
opponent” (p. 6). 
Throughout much of its existence as a PoR, FCS attracted intense scrutiny. 
For example, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 
mandated that “[the] Comptroller General shall conduct an annual review of [FCS] 
and shall, not later than March 15 of each year, submit to Congress a report on the 
results of the most recent review.” The NDAA designated certain items to be 
included in that report, with a focus on (1) systems development and demonstration 
goals and progress; (2) budget for current and next fiscal year for all DoD programs 
supporting FCS; (3) plan for systems development and demonstration; and (4) the 
comptroller general’s conclusion on whether the development and demonstration of 
supporting systems is likely to be completed at a total cost not in excess of the 
amount specified in the Selected Acquisition Report for FCS. 
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The low maturity of FCS component technologies was a significant source of 
problems in systems integration and created substantial risk for the program. Delays 
in component technologies also had a cascading effect through the entire FCS 
enterprise. A GAO report dated March 2007 notes that one best practice in 
knowledge-based acquisition is to have all critical technologies matured to 
technology readiness level (TRL) 7 by the product development phase. However, 
“even with the progress the program has made in the last year, fewer than 35 of 
FCS’s 46 technologies have attained a lower maturity—TRL 6—3½ years after 
starting product development” (GAO, 2007b). The substantial degree of 
interdependency between and among the systems also created a situation in which 
developers could not test components before the completion of the system-of-
systems as a whole, which made low technological maturity particularly dangerous.   
FCS also lacked risk management mechanisms to handle the challenges of 
inconsistent maturity across component technologies. One source observed that 
Army officials were still developing risk mitigation plans as late as April 2004, about 
five years after the start of program’s early stages (Kwak & Smith, 2009). One 
interviewee noted absent specific risk mitigation plans and that FCS program 
management used DAU risk management methodology that was not suitable for the 
governance of cascading technology failures. Combined with the lack of alignment 
on the FCS vision and management between enterprise-level overseers, such as 
OSD(AT&L) and their counterparts in the Army and at the FCS program office, the 
lack of effective risk management contributed to cost growth and schedule slippage. 
At the time of its cancellation, the total cost for FCS had ballooned from initial 
estimates of $99 billion to a projected $200 billion (Cornin, 2012).  
Finally, programmatic problems also contributed to the failure of FCS. First, 
the capabilities in the design of the program had fallen out of alignment with the 
warfighter’s needs. Most notably, the manned ground vehicle (MGV) portion of the 
program in particular was not suited to the close-combat and urban terrain 
operations in which the Army was engaged. A second problem with the program was 
the shortfall of remaining resources compared with the level of progress achieved. 
By the time of the Preliminary Design Review, the program had consumed 60% of its 
funding, which left the remaining portion to cover the entire systems development 
phase.  
These technical, risk-related, and programmatic problems suggest that a 
narrow level of focus at the program level rather than at the level of the enterprise 
can erode the value of a program and commitment to its completion. Although 
discussions at the program manager level touched upon integration with other Army 
programs, the details of integration remained unclear and the program operated in a 
virtual vacuum. Combined with the low alignment of end-user needs with the 
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capabilities the program promised, this level of focus created an environment in 
which the Army was unable to defend against scrutiny of the challenges brought 
about by the complexity of the acquisition effort. 
Most importantly, the program’s failure demonstrates that enforcement is a 
critical governance attribute. The level of technical maturity at early stages of an 
acquisition—especially during solutions analysis and source selection—greatly 
influences the degree to which enforcement is needed and the level of strength and 
formality in enforcement mechanisms. In the case of FCS, enforcement existed 
formally through the DoD 5000-series milestones but does not appear to have been 
strong enough.  
Integrated Deepwater System 
The Integrated Deepwater System (Deepwater) acquisition program began as 
a comprehensive effort to modernize the Coast Guard’s fleet of aviation and 
maritime surface assets, and link them through a sophisticated Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) network. The ambitious recapitalization plan encountered problems 
primarily in its inability to align a diverse set of competing interests. In 2012, the 
program was broken into 13 major acquisition efforts. The Coast Guard’s struggle to 
integrate all of its recapitalization requirements into one formal program illustrates 
that top-down, components-focused governance is ineffective in accomplishing 
complex acquisition.  
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Table 6. Integrated Deepwater System Governance Attributes 
Governance Attributes Program Characteristics 
Level of organizational 
focus 
 Initially managed at the program-level with limited overarching 
leadership 
 From 2009, USCG installed an Executive Oversight Council 
(EOC) to offer programmatic guidance at the enterprise level 
 As of 2012, the Deepwater effort spans 13 major programs  
Integration of functional 
end-user needs 
 Large materiel procurement efforts did not respond to changing 
end-user needs in a timely manner 
 Some asset-level procurement decisions did not correspond with 
program requirements established at the enterprise level  
Decision-making 
authority 
 Nearly all decision-making was delegated to the LSI prior to 
program transition in 2007 
o The LSI contractor issued Request for Information (RFI) and 
Request for Proposal (RFP) documents, in addition to 
handling new contracts through a subcontracting mechanism 
 Today, EOC discusses and coordinates program-level decisions 
o EOC chaired by Acquisition Directorate with executives from 
each of the other USCG directorates 
Enforcement 
 Funding was insufficient to allow on-time delivery of components 
critical to the enterprise-level systems 
 The LSI was held accountable for technical failures through an 
audit process and the threat of recompetition 
Workforce 
 LSI contractor workforce did not have substantial experience in 
implementing acquisition logistics, causing effort redundancies 
and compounding problems with insufficient funding 
 Reliance on LSI contractor for “cradle-to-grave” management of 
Deepwater left USCG with an insufficient acquisition workforce 
Incentive structure  USCG negotiated change order terms and set positive contract 
incentives in its contract with ICGS, the Deepwater LSI contractor 
Knowledge ownership/ 
access to knowledge 
 Deepwater at times lacked dedication of USCG leadership in 




 USCG’s risk management model primarily focused on ensuring 
technologies of interest were at an appropriate technological 
readiness level 
 Standards-based acquisition approach pursued “Plug-and-play” 
technologies for C4 systems 
Note. This table comes from CSIS analysis. 
Deepwater was planned as a two-decade effort to replace 206 aircraft and 93 cutter 
ships. The USCG designed and executed a transformational SoS acquisition 
approach to the program in order to ensure the air, surface, and C4ISR assets 
procured under Deepwater would be integrated and interoperable.  
The program began in 1998 with a RFP for Phase I study that attracted bids 
from three industry teams (Warwick, 1998). In June 2002, the USCG awarded an 
$11 billion LSI contract to Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS), a joint venture 
between Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman formed for the Deepwater 
competition (Koch, 2002). Under the terms of this contract, ICGS was tasked to 
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oversee all asset procurement activities, systems integration operations, and 
program management duties. 
The Coast Guard planned for Deepwater to accomplish a complete 
recapitalization of its aging fleet of air and surface assets. The Coast Guard’s 
decision to approach recapitalization as a system-of-systems was based on the 
belief that the effort could be executed in a more cost-effective manner if all 
Deepwater-capable assets were acquired as one integrated package (O’Rourke, 
2011). The result was a single program led by an industry LSI for the acquisition of 
various quantities of 14 major platforms and several networks and logistics 
components (O’Rourke, 2011, pp. 4–5). Those sub-systems are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. Planned Acquisitions for Deepwater (2006 Baseline)  
# System Quantity Cost ($M) 
1 HC-130J Long-Range Surveillance (LRS) aircraft 6 11 
2 HC-130H LRS aircraft 16 610 
3 HC0144A Medium-Range Surveillance (MRS) aircraft 36 1,706 
4 MH-60T Medium-Range Recover (MRR) helicopters 42 451 
5 HH-65C Multi-Mission Cutter Helicopters (MCHs) 102 741 
6 Vertical take-off unmanned aerial vehicles (VUAVs) 45 503 
7 National Security Cutters (NSCs) 8 3,450 
8 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs) 25 8,098 
9 Fast Response Cutters-Class A (FRC-A) 46 2,613 
10 Fast Response Cutters-Class B (FRC-B) 12 593 
11 Medium Endurance Cutters (MECs) upgraded with Mission Effectiveness 
Project (MEP) 
27 317 
12 Patrol Boats (PBs) upgraded with MEP 17 117 
13 Small boats for Deepwater cutters 124 110 
14 110-foot Island-class PBs converted into 123-foot PBs 8 95 
 
Note. This table was adapted by CSIS from O’Rourke (2011, pp. 4–5). 
Although Deepwater initially garnered praise from policy-makers and stakeholders 
within the government and industry for its innovative approach to acquisition, the 
program encountered several problems in its execution. Funding came at a rate that 
was slower than the service had anticipated, causing program delays (Hughes, 
2003). Enterprise-level requirements were at odds with asset-level requirements in 
at least one high-profile acquisition effort.4 Finally, USCG also had difficulties 
incorporating new and changing requirements into Deepwater, especially as the 
service began executing more homeland security missions in the wake of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
These difficulties, combined with the USCG’s inability to secure sufficient 
accountability from its LSI contractor, eventually led to the dissolution of the LSI-led 
                                            
4 Media sources indicate an effort to overhaul the HH-65 Dolphin engine did not take into account the 
Deepwater requirements on engine certification (see “Honeywell Has Filed,” 2004). 
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acquisition approach. USCG indicated in July 2007 that it would assume the 
integrator role and implement a transition to a model in which asset-level 
procurement is integrated through enterprise-level, government-led governance 
(Geoff, 2009). 
The USCG completed its transition of the Deepwater program in 2012 when it 
split the program into 13 separate programs. In its FY 2012 budget request, the 
Coast Guard proposed scrapping the term “Deepwater” to refer to the asset 
acquisition effort. This reflects the Coast Guard’s view that the fleet is a system-of-
systems for the purposes of integration across the Coast Guard as a whole, but not 
for the purposes of acquisition (O’Rourke, 2012, p. 3).  
Enterprise Model Case Studies 
The enterprise model of acquisition governance breaks SoS acquisition into 
different layers of authority. This characteristic is a key difference between the 
enterprise model and the traditional model, which employs a top-down unified 
approach to governance. The division of authority allows different stages of an SoS 
acquisition effort to influence one another in separate bilateral relationships. It also 
enables individual stages of acquisition to adapt to changes in the external 
environment. These characteristics comprise a more agile approach to acquisition 
(see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Enterprise Acquisition Governance 
Note. This figure comes from CSIS analysis. 
The enterprise model of acquisition governance illustrates that the enterprise 
approach separates general program requirements from sub-system technical 
requirements. This important feature of the enterprise model allows sub-system 
customers the freedom to generate technical requirements specific to their own 
needs while ensuring compatibility and interoperability with the parent system. It also 
promotes standards-based acquisition and open-source, open-architecture 
technology development at the components level. Collectively, these benefits help 
the acquisition community adjust to quickly changing end-user needs and new 
technology developments while maintaining SoS objectives set at the enterprise 
level. 
The enterprise model’s layered authorities also alter the relationship between 
the environment and other elements in the model’s ecosystem. As illustrated by 
Figure 1 in the previous section, the traditional model treats the external 
environment as its own unit. This allows environmental factors to inform user needs 
but makes it more difficult for them to influence other stages of the acquisition effort. 
For example, resource factors are critical to solutions analysis and selection; 
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however, aside from the influence resource factors exert in the initial stages of 
solutions analysis, top-down governance in the traditional model complicates real-
time adjustment to changes in those factors.  
The relationship between the acquisition organization and the external 
environment has a material effect on how acquisition efforts are executed and what 
outcomes they reach. Research on the application of complexity theory to 
organizational design shows that sensitivity to environmental dynamics is critical to 
the effectiveness of product- and innovation-focused organizations, such as the 
organizations created to govern individual DoD acquisition efforts (see Maxfield, 
1997). When an organization is not adequately responsive to changes in the 
external environment, relationships among the internal acquisition elements become 
strained and destabilize.5 In instances where the enterprise model features 
directional leadership—as opposed to top-down, prescriptive leadership—research 
indicates the model allows for different environmental factors to influence 
governance at each acquisition element through the element’s localized authority. 
It is important to note in analysis of the enterprise model that the external 
environment is also a complex system in itself. Changes in the environment 
comprise a second dimension of complexity known in business management 
parlance as “turbulence.” As opposed to the traditional model, which tends to direct 
environmental variables as a whole toward the top of the authority chain, the 
enterprise model facilitates observation of changes in individual factors within the 
external environment and the turbulence that results from their interactions.  For 
example, acquisition personnel and decision-makers can more readily observe the 
impact of a change in operating environment from desert to wetlands—a change in 
operational factors—on the cost of upkeep for a land vehicle—a product factor. This 
dynamic is captured in the “External Environment” section of Figure 2. 
As this discussion indicates, layered authority is the key differentiator of the 
enterprise and traditional models. However, the case studies presented here 
suggest that the acquisition community has been selective about how it divides 
authority even in those efforts most representative of the enterprise model. This is 
where the CSIS eight-attribute governance framework is particularly important. This 
research uses the framework to observe how individual attributes relate to each 
case’s ability to manage complexity internally and externally. The cases show that 
the ability to manage complexity directly correlates with the degree to which the 
responsible stakeholders have independent authority in each attribute for which they 
are accountable.  
                                            
5 Research on complexity in business management concepts and strategy formulation has explored 
these relationships in detail. See, for example, Roger Mason’s (2007) “The External Environment’s 
Effect on Management and Strategy: A Complexity Theory Approach.” 
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The case studies also illustrate that the enterprise model has not been 
applied uniformly to any single acquisition effort. Rather, leaders in the acquisition 
community use best-practices encompassed by individual bilateral relationships 
between different layers of authority to achieve specific program goals. For example, 
the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) program utilizes a bilateral 
relationship between requirements framework and acquisition activities to ensure 
that technical requirements for new sub-systems meet the technical standards of the 
system-of-systems and satisfy its capabilities requirements. Maritime Domain 
Awareness, a Navy-led cross-government effort, has kept its requirements 
framework loose to allow sub-systems to establish their own requirements based on 
their specific external environment.  
CSIS analysis of the case studies shows the enterprise model has produced 
favorable results in cases where it was applied. In several cases, executives from 
SoS acquisition organizations and program offices indicated that their attempts to be 
more focused on enterprise-wide governance have been challenged by the 
existence of specific acquisition standards created without a focus on the challenges 
unique to complexity. Thus, new policies and governance models are needed in 
order to facilitate more uniform application of the model and flexible use of best 
practices illustrated in each of the cases.  
Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar 
The Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) system is an Army asset 
used to detect and destroy rocket, artillery, and mortar threats. The C-RAM 
acquisition effort was initiated through an operational need statement (ONS) issued 
in June 2004 and validated three months later in September of that year (Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation, 2006, pp. 51–52; United States Army, 2010). Due 
to initial reliance on non-developmental items (NDI) and existing assets, the Army 
was able to field its first full C-RAM system by late 2005, only 15 months after the 
issuance of the ONS (“Army to Field,” 2005).6  
                                            
6 The Army had started fielding the C-RAM in mid-year, with the deployment of the SENSE and 
WARN sensor systems.  
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Table 8. Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Governance Attributes 
Governance Attributes Program Characteristics 
Level of organizational 
focus 
 Governance at program-level was supplemented by capabilities-
level focus in other relevant programs 
 Capability-wide executive leadership concentrated in program 
directorate office 
 Strong political support within the executive leadership in the 
Army 
Integration of functional 
end-user needs 
 Direct interface with end-users allows timely consideration of 
changes requested and/or developed by the end-user 




 A program directorate (PD C-RAM) leads decision-making for C-
RAM components and system purchasing, engineering, and 
modifications as necessary 
 Program managers at the levels of Program Executive Office 
(PEO), Department of the Army, and OSD are less involved, but 
offer direction on needs and program implementation 
Enforcement 
 C-RAM did not have formal enforcement mechanisms, but relied 
on aggressive development schedules to encourage stakeholder 
performance 
Workforce  Dedicated contracting and procurement workforce   
Incentive structure  Centralized leadership appeals to common mission to incentivize 
performance 
Knowledge ownership/ 
access to knowledge 
 PM agreed to protect contractor data and supply “truth data” from 
the testing and evaluation range in order to facilitate knowledge 
sharing 
 Contractors required to submit data daily when on the range, at 
threat of removal from the range in the event of non-compliance 
Risk assessment/risk 
management 
 PM assess all systems and system modifications through 
modeling and desktop validation to ensure interoperability 
 Testing at each stage of sub-system acquisition verifies 
interoperability and implementation of ICD 
Note. This table comes from CSIS analysis. 
C-RAM uses a system of sensor command and control (C2) visualization to detect 
threats, display the source of an attack, and warn of potential impact. Those sensors 
relay a threat’s track to the intercept system and pass the point of origin and impact 
data to supporting systems to aid in the response. This SoS approach to the 
problem created a more capable weapons system than the sum of the individual 
component parts.  
The Army initiated the development of C-RAM in order to obtain a solution for 
combating unconventional attacks on fixed assets from temporary short-range 
positions termed “shooting and scooting” (Corbett, Beigh, & Thompson, 2012). 
Insurgents in Iraq used these indirect fire tactics with low trajectory rocket and 
mortar strikes to hit targets while minimizing exposure to counterattack.  
The program directorate C-RAM (PD C-RAM) has overseen the C-RAM 
acquisition effort since the inception of the program. PD C-RAM was originally 
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housed in PEO Command, Control, Communications-Tactical (PEO C3T), reflecting 
the network focus of the office’s charter (Walker, 2010). However, the office 
transitioned to PEO Missiles and Space in May 2011 as the Army began 
consolidating its air and missile defense C2 structure (Walker, 2011). 
Table 9. Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Systems and Components 
System Components 
C2 
Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2) 
Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS) 
SENSE 
Lightweight Counter Mortar Radars (LCMR) 
Firefinder Radars 
Ka- and Ku-Band Multi-Function Radio Frequency Systems (MFRFS) 
INTERCEPT 
Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System (LPWS) 
Accelerated Improved Intercept Initiative (AI3) 
WARN 
Wireless warn 
Wireless Local Area Network (LAN) 
Note. This table comes from CSIS analysis. 
Table 9 outlines C-RAM’s component systems. These include an audio/visual 
emergency warning system and direct network access through a wireless local area 
network. In the event of an attack, C-RAM uses a direct link across Army, Marine, 
and Air Force command and security systems. This information sharing across 
forces and services allows for improved data analysis and more effective anticipation 
of indirect attacks. For example, using C-RAM attack trend data, analysts 
determined a significant decrease in indirect fire during Islamic Holy Days and an 
increase during Western and Christian holidays. Data sets such as these allow 
forces to project likely trends in the number of indirect attacks against forward fixed 
asset positions. 
C-RAM leveraged existing technologies within the DoD and private sector to 
curtail the typical system-of-systems acquisition timeframe of 10–20 years. The 
project brought the concept from its to reality in just 15 months. C-RAM development 
followed the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS), which 
focuses on defining operational requirements and evaluating solutions from an 
operational perspective. Understanding the operational environment and clearly 
framing the problem contributed to developing an effective solution (Corbett et al., 
2012, p. 50). 
The program office has led several improvements to the C-RAM system-of-
systems since its deployment. The Accelerated Improved Intercept Initiative (AI3) is 
one example that illustrates the program’s ability to quickly respond to changing and 
emerging end-user needs. Program leaders began developing this missile 
interceptor sub-system in response to a need for intercept capabilities beyond those 
offered by Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System (LPWS). In order to develop and 
deploy this sub-system quickly, the program office used major components already 
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mature and fielded. This contributed to a quick acquisition period; the program office 
closed a competitive contract on AI3 in less than five months after its initial 
solicitation, and conducted successful live-fire tests just 18 months later. PD C-RAM 
led the development of the Ku Radio Frequency System (KRFS) fire control radar to 
complement the AI3 system. 
It is difficult to quantify the amount of funding that has been directed to the C-
RAM program. Funding has come from multiple budgets. The Army’s procurement 
budget alone shows that C-RAM has received $1.5 billion of direct funding over its 
lifetime (“Counter-Rocket, Artillery & Mortar,” 2011). The figure may be much higher 
if funding for operations and maintenance (O&M), operations at forward operating 
bases, and some of C-RAM’s more advanced components, such as the SENSE and 
WARN sensor systems, are included.7 OCO funding served to generate the initial 
system-of-systems, and cross-service O&M funds and Army Research, 
Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) outlays directed mostly at sensor 
development were critical at later stages to enable quick response to emerging 
needs. 
Despite funding uncertainty, however, the Army has delivered C-RAM without 
clear evidence of cost overruns. In fact, cost-effectiveness appears to be one benefit 
of PD C-RAM’s decision to use mostly NDI to fulfill the Army’s urgent operational 
need. The program was also successful in delivering assets to end-users on 
schedule. 
Distributed Common Ground System 
Since 1998, the DoD has invested billions in the development of technologies 
to network ISR assets across services and ensure their interoperability.8 The result 
of this investment is a family of intelligence systems known as the Distributed 
Common Ground System (DCGS). The DCGS case demonstrates the value of a 
sophisticated and agile workflow, as well as the value of open source standards for 
technology development. 
                                            
7 For an example of additional funding and contract activities dedicated to C-RAM, see the Defense 
Information Systems Agency’s (2011) report, “Counter Rocket, Anti-Mortar Sense and Warn 
Forward Operating Base (FOB) Staffing and Operations.”  
8 The DoD began investing in the DCGS concept in 1998, but the requirements for the program were 
not set until 2003. In that year, a joint working group received approval of its Capstone 
Requirements Document for the DCGS system from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For more on the 
DCGS system’s history prior to program approval, see Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
(2002).  
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Table 10. Distributed Common Ground System Governance Attributes 
Governance Attributes Program Characteristics 
Level of organizational 
focus 
 Program-level focus at each of the four service DCGS Program 
Manager offices 
 Standards, facilitate integration of systems developed at the 
program level within the enterprise 
Integration of functional 
end-user needs 
 Throughout the program, warfighter needs have driven 
development of assets and procurement of NDI  
Decision-making 
authority 
 Centralized at program manager level, with selected areas of 
oversight from PEO 
 PEO provides strong political cover for program manager 
decisions 
Enforcement  No funding for integration, and no mechanism to force integration 
Workforce 
 Dedicated, long-term leadership facilitates expertise and 
commitment to mission 
 Support staff promoted from within 
Incentive structure 
 Few fiscal incentives exist to encourage cooperation with DCGS 
program goals 
 Barriers to entry into the DCGS SoS architecture are low 
Knowledge ownership/ 
access to knowledge 
 Core software architecture adjusted to an open-source standard 
only upon pressure by DCGS customer stakeholders; allows easy 
collaboration and information sharing among developers 
 Standards prevent substantial stovepiping and allow 




 No evidence of substantial risk management tools or metrics for 
assessment 
Note. This table comes from CSIS analysis. 
Prior to the rollout of DCGS, intelligence analysis was largely de-centralized. There 
was little discussion of intelligence or its sources across the services. Collaboration 
on gathering, processing, and dissemination of data was also lacking. The DCGS 
effort originated as an attempt to facilitate data-level interoperability through the use 
of common software architecture, the DCGS Integrated Backbone (DIB).  
DCGS planning segregates contracting, development, and procurement 
activities among the services. Each of the four armed services components acquires 
network assets specific to its own needs. The individual networks operate on the 
DIB, a software system incubated within the Air Force DCGS (AF DCGS) program 
and later expanded to all of the service-specific networks in April 2005 (“Navy Looks 
Forward,” 2005). 
The Army DCGS (DCGS-A) operates as a field tactical data cloud for 
Afghanistan, which incorporates rapid updates of information with real-time 
communication. This allows analysts to perform better data analysis and adapt to 
changing support needs. Leveraging cloud storage and processing allows for more a 
more agile response and better analysis in the field. The Army is working to field a 
browser-based interface through smart phones and tablets to allow for better access 
to the system. 
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No single organization or office holds responsibility for ensuring the service-
specific DCGS systems are interoperable. Instead, enterprise-wide deployment of 
DIB as a common foundation for the DCGS family of systems ensures integration 
and interoperability. The DIB Management Office (DMO) has provided oversight for 
that effort under the direction of an Air Force program lead. Aside from this 
mechanism, each of the four services has substantial autonomy in acquiring its own 
DCGS system. 
Despite its lack of an overt, top-down governance structure, the DCGS 
acquisition effort has progressed on-schedule and without major cost overruns. 
However, this has not shielded the acquisition effort from criticism altogether. 
Service intelligence officials and congressional oversight sources complain that the 
DCGS effort creates wasteful acquisition redundancies across the services, restricts 
access to low-cost commercial IT alternatives and results in asset obsolescence at 
time of fielding (“U.S. Air Force Joins Navy,” 2009; “Four House Lawmakers,” 2013). 
CSIS analysis also suggests the DCGS bottom-up governance approach makes it 
difficult to determine the level of investment in the system and the performance of 
individual asset acquisition efforts.  
Global Nuclear Detection System 
The Global Nuclear Detection System (GNDS) is an informal acquisition effort 
with the backing of USD(AT&L). It consists of fragmentary acquisition programs from 
the DoD, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and non-proliferation agencies 
nominally connected by a shared goal. 
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Table 11. Global Nuclear Detection System Governance Attributes 
Governance Attributes Program Characteristics 
Level of organizational 
focus 
 Program-level focus guided by an overarching, enterprise-level 
policy directive 
Integration of functional 
end-user needs 
 Current system of lax governance, combined with absence of 
GNDS-specific acquisition programs, has suppressed the degree 
to which the system meets end-user needs  
Decision-making 
authority 
 Decision-making authority does not go beyond the level of 
program managers for GNDS-relevant technologies 
Enforcement  No enforcement mechanisms are in place to ensure compliance 
with GNDS objectives 
Workforce  GNDS itself has no dedicated workforce due to the fragmentation 
of programs across different departments and agencies 
Incentive structure  Decision-making authority does not go beyond the level of 
program managers for GNDS-relevant technologies 
Knowledge ownership/ 
access to knowledge 
 GNDS program managers indicate in interviews with CSIS that 
knowledge sharing has been difficult in the program because 
without an overarching purview, visions on the GNDS differ 
among the various stakeholders 
 There were also related issues with communication, in which it 
has been difficult to coordinate and synchronize the vision and 
mission across the numerous relevant entities 
Risk assessment/risk 
management 
 No measures have been taken to assess or control for risk at the 
moment, reflecting the immaturity of the effort 
Note. This table comes from CSIS analysis. 
The detection of nuclear and radioactive threats is a broad undertaking that 
encompasses activities within both the civil and defense realms. For this reason, the 
DoD has taken the position that a single technology or family of technologies alone 
cannot meet the challenges of nuclear detection, especially on a global scale. As a 
result of this position, GNDS has not codified into a formal system-of-systems or 
program. Instead, the DoD has mostly looked at nuclear detection through the lens 
of interagency coordination. Several offices within the DoD have contributed, with 
particular leadership from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs within the OUSD(AT&L).  
Due to its informal nature, and because authorities have not allocated funding 
for GNDS, it is unclear how successful this effort has been. Research uncovers no 
evidence that individual agencies have undertaken acquisition with the explicit 
purpose of achieving the GNDS goals outlined by the USD(AT&L) Treaty 
Compliance and Homeland Defense Coordinator. Furthermore, although policies 
exist on countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and nuclear threats, no 
guidance has been offered in what GNDS requirements are, how a completed 
GNDS solution would be structured, or timelines for GNDS capabilities roll-out.  
The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) exists as a model of what 
GNDS might look like if it is to become a program of record. In the absence of 
meaningful acquisition activity under the GNDS family, the DoD mostly has ceded 
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the lead role in global nuclear detection to the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
(DNDO) in DHS. DNDO leads GNDA as a federal-civilian, cross-agency system-of-
systems responsible for detecting nuclear and radiological threats in the homeland. 
A network of radiation detection equipment comprises the backbone of GNDA, with 
much of the program’s outlays directed toward the procurement and maintenance of 
these assets. In contrast with this approach, the DoD’s nuclear detection efforts are 
less coordinated. Individual offices pursue nuclear detection technologies consistent 
with GNDS goals, but there is no governance mechanism in place to ensure the 
interoperability of those systems, nor to enforce acquisition best practices within 
sub-systems.   
While GNDA provides one example of how GNDS could be governed if it 
were to become a formal PoR, challenges in its implementation also illustrate areas 
where complexity complicates the acquisition of the system-of-systems. As with 
GNDS, the GNDA model has been criticized for loose program requirements and a 
lack of cross-agency coordination (Biesecker, 2008). To the extent that the DoD 
begins pursuing GNDS more aggressively without a clearer definition of the system-
of-systems’ objectives and end-state, it is likely to encounter challenges resulting 
from the varied level of commitment to the GNDS mission from stakeholder 
organizations. 
Harvest HAWK 
The Harvest Hercules Airborne Weapons Kit program—Harvest HAWK, for 
short—is the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) effort to equip KC-130J 
Hercules refueling tankers with a weapons kit and ISR capabilities. The project met 
the need for an armed KC-130J variant for Close Air Support that the USMC outlined 
in its universal need statement on July 21, 2008 (“DoD Finalizes C-130,” 2008). 
Naval Air Systems Command, the contracting agency for the program, oversaw a 
development process that brought the HAWK to theater in less than two years, from 
the need statement in July 2008 to Initial Operating Capability (IOC) on October 13, 
2010 (“U.S. Naval Aviation and Weapons Development in Review,” 2012). 
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Table 12. Harvest HAWK Governance Attributes 
Governance Attributes Program Characteristics 
Level of organizational 
focus 
 Operational needs statement dated July 21, 2008 outlined the 
need for an armed KC-130J for close air support. 
Integration of functional 
end-user needs 
 Modifications of the system in development have directly 
incorporated end-user needs. Examples include the derringer 
door modification, which allows crews to discharge munitions 
without depressurizing the main cabin.  
Decision-making 
authority 
 Flat leadership structure with clearly designated decision-making 
authority 
Enforcement  No enforcement mechanisms observed 
Workforce  Small, agile workforce with technical expertise and high familiarity 
with operational needs 
Incentive structure 
 Because Harvest HAWK was not competed but instead given to 
the C-130 airframe supplier, strong incentives were not in place 
to ensure timely and cost-effective delivery 
Knowledge ownership/ 
access to knowledge 
 Flat, lean structure of program team prevented the emergence of 
significant obstacles knowledge access 
Risk assessment/risk 
management 
 No risk management mechanisms observed 
 The Marine Corps mitigated most risks upfront by using highly 
mature and commercially available products 
Note. This table comes from CSIS analysis. 
The DoD carried out HAWK contracting in a piece-meal fashion, with one round of 
kit development followed by several rounds of unit purchase and aircraft modification 
contracts. Lockheed Martin won a $22.8 million sole-source contract for the 
development of HAWK in May 2009 (“Fuel and Fires,” 2009). Under the terms of the 
contract, NavAir agreed to purchase one development HAWK. The contracting office 
later awarded Lockheed Martin a $21.3 million contract in September 2009 for the 
purchase of two additional units (Department of Defense Information, 2009). As of 
this writing, total purchases include six D-Kits (roll-on/roll-off mission kits) and 10 
KC-130Js carry the HAWK (United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons 
Learned, 2012). 
HAWK consists of a Lockheed Martin AN/AAQ-30 Target Sight System 
(TSS), as well as AGM-114 Hellfire missiles and a 30mm cannon (“Marines to 
Deploy,” 2010). Some kits also carried a ramp-mounted release system for 
“Gunslinger” precision-guided munitions (United States Naval Institute, 2012). The 
Marine Corps installed a “derringer door” modification in 2012 to allow the HAWK-
equipped KC-130J aircraft to fire MBDA GBU-44/E Viper Strike glide munitions while 
the aircraft remains pressurized, reducing the time and preparation necessary for 
weapons deployment (“Harvest Hawk Tests Prove Successful,” 2012). Of the kit’s 
components, only the TSS—which entered IOC in April 2009 as a component of the 
AH-1Z Cobra aircraft—was in development at the time of the initial contract in April 
2009 (“Lockheed Martin Delivers First Target,” 2009). 
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Figure 3. Harvest Hercules Airborne Weapons Kit System Components 
The Harvest HAWK system adds a lethal edge to a long-standing Marine Corps air 
platform. Harvest Hawk crews provide close air support to ground forces and can 
sustain this air support longer than conventional fighter jets or helicopters. The 
system has been vital to ground troop support in remote regions such as the 
Helmand province in Southern Afghanistan. 
Combined with a contracting process that allowed for the purchase of HAWK 
units in successive procurement rounds, the contracting office’s decision to use NDI 
to meet the Marines Corps urgent need request contributed to the success of the 
Harvest HAWK acquisition effort. Apart from some delay in incorporating the 30mm 
cannon into the roll-on/roll-off kit (“Official,” 2011), the program managers achieved 
success without cost or schedule overruns. Acquisition officials also were able to 
address substantial drawbacks of the ramp-mounted munitions release system—that 
it required operators to depressurize before releasing Gunslinger munitions and to 
remove the apparatus to allow the KC-130J to perform cargo transport missions—
with the installation of the derringer door (Roosevelt, 2012). Thus, when viewed in 
isolation, the Harvest HAWK program stands as a model for successful SoS 
acquisition through a contracted LSI. 
Harvest HAWK also serves as a useful case for demonstrating the 
importance of continually integrating end user needs into the system and its 
components. The developers used an existing and widely accepted platform, the C-
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130, with kit-based components and other modifications to meet the warfighter’s 
needs in the field. The installation of the derringer door to reduce the deployment 
timeframe for the system represents an improvement directly based on end-user 
feedback. 
Maritime Domain Awareness 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is an international, interagency strategy 
to deal with threats and challenges in maritime theaters. When it is completed, the 
MDA system-of-systems will be able collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate data 
among defense, law enforcement, and border protection officials from the United 
States and allied countries to create a cross-domain common operating view. 
Analysis of the process of putting together MDA suggests the program illustrates 
that formal mechanisms are necessary in complex acquisition efforts to encourage 
commitment to the effort’s mission among stakeholder entities, and the active 
involvement of those entities in the development and procurement of component 
systems.  
Table 13. Maritime Domain Awareness Governance Attributes 
Governance Attributes Program Characteristics 
Level of organizational 
focus 
 Implementation at sub-program level 
 Enterprise-level integration has been prescribed but not 
implemented 
Integration of functional 
end-user needs 
 MDA infrastructure integrates end-user needs as they were 
describe at program outset, but does not possess mechanisms 
for integrating new and changing needs 
 Sub-program funding allows for reverse integration, in which 
spiral technologies are folded into new needs 
Decision-making 
authority 
 Capabilities and funding decisions isolated at program level, 
where program executives choose whether and to what extent 
MDA should be incorporated in investment objectives 
Enforcement  No substantial enforcement guiding MDA-relevant programs to 
desired end state 
Workforce  No investments in new workforce development, relying instead on 
existing acquisition workforce at individual program offices 
Incentive structure  Program managers have no incentive to incorporate MDA 
objectives into requirements or acquisition operations 
Knowledge ownership/ 
access to knowledge 
 Informal knowledge sharing occurs through white papers and 
other forms of thought-leadership 
Risk assessment/risk 
management 
 Lack of meaningful leadership mechanisms creates high-risk 
environment with no identified tools for management of 
unforeseen circumstances 
Note. This table comes from CSIS analysis. 
The MDA concept originated from a 1998 presidential initiative and was developed 
further in National Security Presidential Directive 41 (NSPD-41) and Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 13 (HSPD-13), both released on December 21, 2004. 
Since then, the technology investment strategy and the supporting offices and 
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business systems established to execute MDA have undergone numerous changes. 
Currently, the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO), under the 
direction of appointees from the Navy and Coast Guard, is the nominal lead for 
MDA’s information exchange portal, the open architecture tool at the heart of the 
MDA mission. 
MDA does not necessarily consist of prescribed technologies. A number of 
policy directives have offered strategic direction on capabilities required; however, 
the participating agencies—primarily the USCG and Navy, with some additional 
contributions from Customs and Border Protection—have mostly led their own 
system acquisition initiatives. Most notably, the Navy planned two stages, or 
“spirals,” of technology acquisition to develop and integrate the infrastructure MDA 
would need in order to enable maritime security capabilities. Table 14 outlines the 
specific technologies sought in the first spiral. 
Table 14. Spiral 1 MDA Technologies 
Technology Acquisition Efforts 
Electronic Maritime Interdiction Operations 
(E-MIO) Wireless 
 Trident Warrior Exercises  
 Small-scale initial deployment on USS Cole 
Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA)  Joint development with Republic of Singapore 
 Tool-kit development and technology refresh 
Global Trader  Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) led development of 
Global Trader database and search engine 
Google Apps & Earth  Used in support of pilot programs for MDA, such as 
InRelief, a humanitarian database 
MDA Data Sharing Community of Interest  Coordination with stakeholder organizations 
 Testing of existing solutions 
Maritime Global Network (MAGNet)  Navy oversight for testing and integration 
 Coast Guard solutions analysis and development 
Tripwire  IBU led development of threat detection toolkits and 
deployed to targeted stakeholders 
Law Enforcement Information Exchange 
(LInX) 
 Development through Naval Criminal Investigation 
Service (NCIS) 
FAST2CAP  Deployment among U.S. and international defense 
and federal-civil stakeholders 
Note. This table comes from CSIS analysis. 
The Navy’s process of selecting and developing technology solutions represents a 
departure from more traditional acquisition workflows. Similar to other acquisitions, 
the Navy released an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) for “Data Fusion and 
Analysis Functions of Navy Maritime Domain Awareness” and identified shortfalls in 
cross-agency MDA capabilities in 2009. However, interviews with DoD officials 
indicate that the ICD reflects the Navy’s position alone and does not necessarily 
correspond with specific requirements for other agencies (GAO, 2011). The Navy 
created and refined requirements for the technologies comprising the MDA system-
of-systems through an iterative development process.  
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Through its iterative spiral approach to technology development, the Navy 
began with enterprise-wide requirements defining the doctrine, materiel, leadership 
and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) necessary for the MDA mission. 
This first round of requirements identifies tasks each system or system-of-systems 
needs to accomplish. The Navy then selects a solution or a number of solutions to 
accomplish those tasks and tests them against specific objectives and metrics. The 
Navy then refines the requirements based on this testing and selects those solutions 
that best meet them. It then conducts another round of testing on those solutions. 
This process continues until the Navy reaches an end-state of DOTMLPF 
requirements and selects the most appropriate technology. 
The E-MIO Wireless presents one example of this process as it operates in 
practice. The Navy tested E-MIO as a partial solution in 2006. At the time, the 
wireless network successfully completed a number of tasks involved in the 
interdiction of vessels. The Navy installed the kit on the USS Cole in April 2007. It 
also tested the kit in the 2006 and 2007 Trident Warrior exercises. Lessons learned 
from these initial operations and tests contributed to refined requirements, lessons 
learned analysis, and a refresh of fielded iterations (Ackerman, 2007). 
Analysis of budget requests from 2009 to present day show that, to date, 
services have procured MDA assets mostly under the umbrella of larger program 
elements. For example, in the case of the E-MIO Wireless network kit described 
here, the PEO for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence 
(C4I) led the development of that technology without any formal or statutory 
coordination amongst other MDA stakeholders. Furthermore, with the exception of 
some Office of Naval Research (ONR)-led research and development (R&D) 
programs, the services have procured primarily NDI and commercial off-the shelf 
(COTS) products. As a result of this approach to acquisition, investments in MDA 
are difficult to quantify, progress is difficult to monitor, and oversight is difficult to 
ensure.  
Results of Interviews 
The case summaries above offer descriptive, program-specific attributes 
related to the governance of complex SoS acquisition efforts. In addition to the 
attribute-specific information presented here, interviews with acquisition executives 
suggest that an agile and multi-layered governance process can lessen the 
operational burden of managing and delivering complex systems-of-systems. 
Furthermore, strong enforcement mechanisms are necessary to ensure outcomes 
are in line with expectations. 
In order to capture specific best practices from the perspectives of those 
involved in specific example programs, the CSIS research team conducted 
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interviews based on its established framework of eight governance attributes. 
Researchers conducted 11 interviews in total with the participation of 17 acquisition 
executives. Each interview lasted about 1–2 hours and was semi-structured to allow 
interviewees to stray from the explicit governance attributes and provide more 
general commentary on acquisition challenges. Each program has at least one 
interview associated with it in order to ensure broad coverage of all case studies. 
Following each interview, researchers compiled key points according to 
attributes and periodically categorized them into broader findings. Interviewers 
loosely structured the interview sessions around the role of each attribute in the 
specific case. Collectively, information gathered from interviews serves to aggregate 
and organize expertise on the subject of acquisition governance for analysis of best 
practices. 
Collectively, the conversations suggested that five themes are critical to 
understanding governance of complex acquisition. These themes are presented 
here in order of importance to governance.  
Theme #1: Stakeholders must maintain focus on the end-result of an 
acquisition effort at the enterprise level.   
First, complex acquisition governance requires that all stakeholders maintain 
focus on the end-result at the enterprise level. This structural issue is central to a 
system’s ability to operate in an environment consisting of multiple other systems. 
Interviewees suggest that a narrow focus—focus on a specific product or capability 
set, for example—compromises the value of a single system’s acquisition to the 
overall objectives of the system-of-systems and its user communities. This narrow 
focus also contributes to demand uncertainty in instances where stakeholders 
simultaneously develop multiple competing capabilities to accomplish the same end 
goal. 
FCS offers several insights about the impact of a product- or program-level 
focus on the success of an acquisition effort. A former DoD acquisition official 
involved in overseeing FCS reports that many in the acquisition community charged 
with approving the program at its various 5000-series milestones were frustrated that 
its network components duplicated the functions of existing technologies. 
Furthermore, the source continues, FCS had no roadmap for integration with 
interacting systems, namely the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), an 
all-encompassing Army tactical network program, and Joint Network Node (JNN), a 
SatCom system. One interviewee criticized the program for attempting to build its 
own operating systems, called SOSCO, from scratch rather than use existing 
operating systems able to interface with WIN-T and JNN. The engineers had no plan 
for bringing those pieces together, and testing their interactions required that the 
entire system first be fielded, the interviewee reports. 
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Interviews with several program executives and stakeholders provide an 
important nuance to the importance of enterprise-level focus. In cases such as FCS 
where focus is narrow, problems emerge where the feasibility of end-state 
integration is unclear. Integration problems also surface in cases where enterprise-
focus is present, however. In MDA, for example, acquisition executives maintained a 
focus on the objectives of the entire enterprise, but were presented with challenges 
to enterprise-wide integration all the same.  
Theme #2: A layered decision-making structure with distinct, delegated 
authority must be clearly established at the outset of complex acquisition 
efforts. 
The reason for integration problems, even in those programs in which 
organizational focus is held at the enterprise level, underscores a second theme 
about complex acquisition governance. It suggests that a layered decision-making 
structure with distinct, delegated authority must be clearly established at the outset 
of complex acquisition efforts in order for their level of organizational focus to matter.  
Interview results show that the various process constraints faced by each of 
the acquisition case studies—for example, clarity and consistency of scope, 
availability of personnel, inventory of resources, and so forth—are attributable in part 
to their decision-making structures. Process constraints also translate to poor 
outcomes in cases where decision-making structures were not designed to meet the 
specific needs of an acquisition effort, or where decision-making authority was weak 
or non-existent. 
The MDA effort demonstrates the challenges created by weak and heavily 
centralized decision-making authority. In that case, interviewees report that the 
Executive Agent for MDA (EAMDA) has notional leadership over stakeholder 
agencies, but no real decision-making authority. Instead, it serves in the role of what 
one interviewee calls a “broker and a cheerleader.” Formally, EAMDA issued an 
Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) to allow material solutions development under 
the standard defense acquisition process. However, there is no formal lead for 
requirements generation or subsequent acquisition decisions. As a result, 
stakeholder agencies have different perceptions of the MDA charter and what 
technologies satisfy its core mission objectives. These definitional issues emerge in 
the absence of strong central leadership. Interviewees support this observation and 
report similar challenges in the GNDS case study. 
The DCGS case contrasts with the MDA case because the DCGS decision-
making structure is relatively well-suited to the mission objectives of that acquisition, 
particularly in its decentralization. One DCGS executive reports that DCGS decision-
making is conceptually separated into recommendation and implementation 
functions. This concept is mapped in Figure 4, which outlines the DCGS 
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organizational structure and the processes involved in key functions of an 
acquisition. 
 
Figure 4. Distributed Common Ground System Conceptual Governance 
Structure and Key Acquisition Processes 
The DCGS Steering Board serves as a strong, central leadership entity to provide 
capabilities guidance and keep development and procurement efforts aligned with 
core mission requirements. The Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps each have 
their own lead entities for the implementation functions. Each of the service 
components refers to the ICD to draft Capabilities Production Documents (CPDs) for 
each of their respective systems. The DCGS Steering Board then reviews the new 
capabilities to determine their fit with the standards and specifications established in 
the ICD and governed by a central interoperability framework, the Defense 
Intelligence Information Enterprise (DI2E). Similar to MDA and GNDS, this workflow 
represents an agile approach to decision-making that empowers end-user 
communities with substantially different requirements to make their own 
procurement decisions. However, it is supplemented by strong, formalized central 
leadership. 
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Theme #3: Decision-makers must design effective management and 
enforcement mechanisms and integrate them into the acquisition process. 
Interviewees suggest that enforcement mechanisms are the critical 
component tying together the enterprise focus with product-level decision-making. In 
order to maintain short chains of authority between the technical communities at the 
bottom of the production chain with the enterprise-level planners at the top, decision-
makers must design effective management and enforcement mechanisms and 
integrate them into the acquisition process. Formalized program management 
mechanisms consisting of a well-defined set of performance criteria have the 
advantage of lessening the process burden of complex acquisition. With 
complementary incentives and metrics for monitoring performance, enhanced 
program management can also contribute to improved cost and schedule outcomes.  
The process advantages of effective program management are apparent in 
the DCGS case. The DCGS effort runs an overarching recommendations and review 
process through the DCGS Steering Board, but delegates acquisition 
implementation to individual end-user communities based on a common set of 
standards established in the DI2E Framework. At the systems level, the acquiring 
service can approach risk in technology acquisition on a case-by-case basis. The 
acquiring armed forces component can also design its contract or contracts based 
on the scale of a particular acquisition item, or whether the acquisition is 
developmental or non-developmental. At the enterprise level, the DCGS Steering 
Board has a mediation process through which it can deny efforts that it determines 
to be too risky or that do not contribute to the DCGS mission objectives.  
The effectiveness of the DCGS program management structure is particularly 
apparent when compared with the management systems used in other large 
complex acquisition cases, such as Future Combat Systems (FCS) and Integrated 
Deepwater System (Deepwater). In these cases, acquisition was directed through 
single, service-centric programs-of-record. An overarching rule-set was applied to all 
subordinate efforts. Sources interviewed suggest DCGS has avoided the process 
rigidity that plagued FCS and Deepwater in part because of its separation of top-
down program recommendations and bottom-up program implementation. 
Theme #4: Program leadership must prevent vested interests and cost 
concerns from becoming barriers to knowledge ownership. 
Organizational focus at the enterprise level, driven by clearly delegated 
decision-making authority, and supported by effective enforcement mechanisms, 
creates the underpinnings of a complex governance structure. However, any one of 
these components can be compromised when stakeholders are unable or unwilling 
to share information. This points at a fourth theme in complex acquisition 
governance: In order to execute a complex acquisition effort effectively and 
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efficiently, agencies and offices partnered in the technical development of systems 
as well as the duties of program management must be able to access and share 
information among themselves. Oftentimes, barriers to knowledge access can inhibit 
the success of a complex project. Conversations with interviewees suggest that 
knowledge access also depends on strong incentives for active sharing of 
information about technologies, program goals, and progress toward established 
milestones. 
Interviewees indicate that there are two types of barriers to effective 
information sharing and knowledge access. The first barrier is knowledge 
protectionism. Especially in instances of collaboration between private sector 
stakeholders, conversations with interviewees suggest that companies are more 
likely to withhold information from partner entities due to competition for other 
government contracts. This concern was especially strong in early efforts to make 
the DCGS Integration Backbone (DIB) software package open-source. In an effort to 
facilitate software revisions to more effectively meet the needs of individual end-user 
communities, the DCGS Steering Board and DI2E Integration Council were strongly 
supportive of revealing the DIB source code to the development community. 
However, according to one program source, the DIB parent developer resisted 
efforts to make the software open-source. In the end, DCGS customer offices were 
able to compel the contractor to share its knowledge.  
Program challenges resulted from early resistance to revealing the DIB 
software code. By compelling its primary software contractor to open its code for 
other users to access and develop, the DCGS program office demonstrated how a 
large organization can hedge against knowledge protectionism. Using the code, DIB 
challenger MarkLogic successfully developed a version of the DIB based on 
Extensible Markup Language (XML, an open-standards software encoding format) to 
more adequately meet the needs of a sub-segment of the broader end-user 
community. Namely, MarkLogic’s DIB was a better fit for United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM or SOCOM), which had a need for a high-
performance reconnected-ops DI2E. 
A second barrier to information sharing is created by differing levels of 
information management capabilities. Levels of technical astuteness can be widely 
different between government customers and industry suppliers. This problem is 
compounded by varied clearance privileges required for access to, and use of, 
compartmentalized information. Sources interviewed indicate this problem has 
complicated several systems-of-systems acquisitions. Interviewees suggest that 
information needs among stakeholders in MDA are challenged both by the breadth 
of information collected and the need to filter it to lower levels of clearance, 
especially unclassified civil users in the Coast Guard. For participants in the 
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Hercules Airborne Weapons Kit effort—known more commonly as Harvest HAWK—
data relevant to that program were only accessible through a single computer 
network, requiring physical ownership of the data for effective information sharing. 
Sources point to these barriers as real and addressable challenges to acquiring and 
integrating systems-of-systems. 
Theme #5: Leaders at each level of the system-of-systems must be adaptable 
to changes that result from human behavior. 
A fifth and final theme of complex governance reported by interviewees 
observes that leaders at each level of the system-of-systems must be adaptable to 
changes resulting from human behavior. This theme is applicable not just to the 
acquisition of complex systems-of-systems involving many components and 
stakeholders, but also to other systems in the natural world. Human behavior is the 
ultimate uncertainty, and agility is critical to absorbing the impact of its changes.  
Within SoS acquisition efforts specifically, effective governance will recognize 
changes in the needs of a system’s end-users early and reevaluate the usefulness 
of a planned acquisition. This feedback loop can be formalized through component-
level proposals for new capabilities (MDA). It can also be more ad hoc, incorporating 
standards-based innovations developed by end-users into the completed system-of-
systems (DCGS). In either case, the DoD 5000 series approach to acquisition 
appears to limit responsiveness to end-user needs.  
In general, effectiveness appears to share a strong correlation with cases that 
were initiated with a clear end-user in mind. For example, the Harvest HAWK 
acquisition was born out of the necessity to provide air support for Marines in 
Afghanistan. The Marines were deployed to train Afghan security forces. Although 
they were not under the purview of Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), they 
developed an urgent need for air support when their training unit encountered 
persistent attacks from adversary forces. Information obtained from the Marines 
provided an impetus for the Harvest HAWK acquisition effort, making this case 
particularly representative of the effective use of human information inputs to 
produce and procure capabilities specifically answering the needs of the end-user. 
An additional aspect of human input is the workforce that a system-of-
systems effort has at its disposal. A good technical and program management 
workforce can make the difference between an effort’s success and failure. 
Recruiting a truly great workforce can dramatically improve both the magnitude of a 
system’s success as well as the process required to develop and procure it. Here, 
interviews suggest Harvest HAWK provides an example of the importance of skilled 
technical personnel supplemented by experienced program managers. A former 
program source indicates that Harvest HAWK’s success in delivering a complex 
capability in a small period of time is attributable in part to the ability of the program 
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management to take advantage of the technical workforce available through 
NAVAIR.  
Several other cases illustrate that a strong program management workforce is 
not as effective in delivering a system-of-systems capability when it has a weak 
technical workforce at its disposal. Sources suggested that workforce strength is not 
measured by technical skillsets alone. Rather, complex acquisition efforts benefit 
when their workforce is empowered to use its technical know-how to innovate new 
approaches to problems.  
Although technical astuteness tends to reside with human capital in 
engineering functions, program managers often mistake general capabilities needs 
with prescriptive technical requirements under the existing framework for acquisition. 
Sources interviewed suggest that there is structural resistance to bottom-up 
innovation of new approaches to meeting capabilities demands. For example, one 
interviewee from the Harvest HAWK program indicated that a problem with coding 
on the Harvest HAWK’s gimbal kept a team from the program office and the lead 
contractor in a room collaborating for weeks to find a fix. In the end, an engineer 
from the program team was separated from the effort and replaced with a new 
engineer. The new engineer recognized the flaw in the code within an hour, rescuing 
the program from further delay. The engineer was able to accomplish this in part 
because he was empowered to contribute his unique knowledge of coding. 
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A New Model of Systems-of-Systems Acquisitions 
By combining the outcome and process challenges observed in the case 
studies above with in-depth, original data aggregated through interviews, CSIS 
developed the acquisition model presented in Table 15. 
Table 15. Best Practices in Systems-of-Systems Acquisition 
Governance Attributes Program Characteristics 
Level of organizational 
focus 
 Program-level focus supplemented by overarching enterprise-
level governance and short authority chains 
Integration of functional 
end-user needs 
 Kit-based, modular systems allow timely integration of end-user 
needs and changes in the external environment 
 End-users are encouraged and empowered to develop their own 




 Stakeholders are given relative autonomy to make systems-level 
decisions based on standards and common operating 
environments installed at the enterprise-level 
 A central governance oversight body holds auditing and 
enforcement powers in order to maintain commitment to a 
system-of-systems’ core objectives 
Enforcement 
 Enterprise-level authorities maintain ability to review and revise 
gate decisions as sub-systems evolve and needs change 
 Clear, systems-specific reporting requirements are established 
based on technological maturity and projected development 
schedules to support enforcement authority 
Workforce 
 Systems-level technical workforce includes recent or one-time 
end-users in order to create greater symmetry between end 
capability and changing user needs 
 SoS-level technical workforce is small and agile to avoid 
parochial interests 
 Lean but dedicated programmatic workforce to create and 
support technical expertise 
Incentive structure 
 Uses budgetary and personnel levers to foster mission 
commitment and compliance with established standards 
 Low barriers to the entry of new technologies and the innovation 
of existing solutions 
Knowledge ownership/ 
access to knowledge 
 Leadership shows sensitivity to the wide range of information-
handling capacity and ability of different stakeholders throughout 
an organization to manage and understand information 
 Leadership also campaigns to accommodate those stakeholder 
entities with lower information-handling capacity and ensure their 
interests are also incorporated into the information feedback loop 
 Standards and network backbones are freely shared amongst 




 Critical technologies are highly mature and COTS where possible 
 Clear, measurable metrics are established to monitor less mature 
technologies and changes in the external environment 
Note. This table comes from CSIS analysis. 
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Analysis of Best Practices 
The analysis extracted these best practices based on a force ranking of the 
impact of performance in any single attribute on the process and outcome of each 
individual case study. CSIS independently assessed success factors in the attributes 
and supplemented analysis with primary input from sources interviewed. This 
approach facilitated analysis by incorporating the existing literature on complex 
systems with the expertise of acquisition executives with intimate knowledge of an 
individual case or multiple cases. 
Critical Best Practices 
An assessment of the case studies shows that success in three attributes in 
particular is critical to SoS acquisition. Those attributes are level of organizational 
focus, decision-making authority, and enforcement. The attributes are closely related 
and strong performance in any one is dependent upon performance in the other two. 
Organizational focus at the enterprise level is critical to enabling SoS 
integration and facilitating flexibility for quick and substantive response to changes in 
the external environment. Although critical, enterprise-level focus is limited when it is 
not supplemented with some program-level focus on individual capabilities. The 
DCGS case, for example, shows the value of allowing programs and sub-system 
acquisition efforts to govern themselves to a certain point.  
The key to differentiating these two levels of focus and ensuring that they 
interact with and respond to one another is in part related to the decision-making 
authority attribute. At the program level, stakeholders should be delegated the 
authority to make decisions about systems and technologies with a low burden of 
approval from the enterprise-level. This is especially important in complex systems-
of-systems. The organizational legwork a program has to perform in order to 
approve a new sub-system that has newly developed or emerged as an end-user 
need can prevent the program from timely and effective integration of that 
technology or capability.  
One way to achieve the right level of agility in decision-making delegation is 
to establish open-source standards for new technologies and systems as a 
replacement for traditional, formal oversight mechanisms. In interviews with CSIS, 
several Coast Guard executives indicated that it is already implementing this best 
practice post-Deepwater to ensure interoperability among C4ISR systems across its 
fleet of surface vessels and aircraft. Interviews also indicate DCGS revealed its 
DCGS Integration Backbone (DIB) for open source use, allowing industry to create a 
new and specialized XML-based search engine in order to meet a very specific end-
user need. Therefore, this best practice assists decision-makers at the enterprise 
level by lessening their programmatic requirements, and empowers decision-makers 
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at the program level, as well as end-users themselves, to reflect SoS ecosystem 
changes in their planned acquisition activities. 
The enforcement attribute links decision-making authority with level of 
organizational focus. Effective enforcement mechanisms enable enterprise 
governance authorities to keep program managers on-cost and on-schedule while 
easing the operational burdens associated with delivering large, complex systems-
of-systems. Although statutory mechanisms for enforcement are established in the 
DoD’s standard acquisition process, case study analysis finds those mechanisms 
custom-tailored to the specific demands of the individual system-of-systems to be 
most successful. For example, the DCGS effort created a central authority to review 
petitions for capabilities from an enterprise perspective, and reserves the right to 
deny an sub-system acquisition effort in the event that it is determined to be 
incompatible with the SoS objectives. This exists outside of the standard DoD 
acquisition enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, the case of Future Combat 
Systems (FCS) illustrates how existing mechanisms can in fact be counterproductive 
and conceal underlying problems in a complex SoS acquisition effort.  
Enabling Best Practices 
In addition to the critical best practices, performance in the remaining 
attributes enables SoS acquisition efforts to reach end capabilities with fewer cost 
and schedule problems. These enabling best practices also contribute to greater 
alignment between a system-of-systems and the needs of its end-users. Finally, best 
practices in the remaining attributes help to mitigate problems of technology 
obsolescence and help ease the tendency for innovation in modern defense 
platforms to lag behind commercial industry.  
Successful SoS acquisition efforts accomplish greater integration of functional 
end-user needs in part through the encouragement of innovation at the sub-systems 
level. One best practice in this regard involves the establishment and publication of 
open standards for software and systems. The DCGS offers one example. In that 
case study, DCGS program management responded to a SOCOM need for high-
performance reconnected ops DI2E by pressuring the DCGS prime contractor to 
release the DIB source kernel for open-source collaboration. Using the DIB package, 
MarkLogic, a supplier of enterprise database software, created an XML database. In 
the end, the software proved valuable to SOCOM, a specific end-user community 
with unique, niche requirements.  
In addition to revealing systems for open-source innovation, case study 
analysis also indicates that kit-based and modular approaches to materiel 
development can contribute to greater integration of end-user needs. The reverse of 
this is the more traditional platform-based development. Harvest HAWK provides 
one example of this best practice. In that program, users found the original kit to be 
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inconvenient because of its weapons release mechanism. Namely, in order to 
deploy missiles, the system had to first depressurize. The installation of a derringer 
door into the kit corrected the issue, and was made possible by the fact that the kits 
are not permanently installed on the C-130J platforms. The roll-on/roll-off nature of 
the Harvest HAWK capability allows for refinements not requiring significant SoS-
level changes. In contrast with this best practice, systems acquired under a 
traditional model show a heavily diminished ability to integrate changing end-user 
needs. Future Combat Systems (FCS), for example, folded all capabilities into a 
slow-moving platform acquisition effort in a way that precluded changes to sub-
systems based on new end-user needs.  
In either of the two best practices in user needs integration (i.e., open source 
standards and kit-based development), performance in knowledge ownership and 
access to knowledge is an important enabler. For this reason, case studies illustrate 
that open-source publication of standards and basic software is a best practice in the 
information access attribute. However, revealing the foundation for a system-of-
systems alone is not enough to enable stakeholders to develop and refresh sub-
systems. This information is only meaningful insofar as leadership in any SoS 
acquisition effort recognizes that stakeholders across a system-of-systems vary 
widely in their ability to access, understand, and use information that is available to 
them.  
Systematic and institutional stovepipes are one obstacle to information 
ownership. Other, less tangible obstacles include lower technical expertise among 
information consumers, lack of sufficient resources to handle the financial and 
technical costs of information, and compatibility issues in the recipients’ systems 
with the format or type of information. Therefore, one best practice to facilitate 
knowledge ownership and access to information is to campaign for—or in the event 
that the provider of information is also the lead stakeholder for a system-of-systems, 
to approve and make available—the budgetary and technical resources necessary 
for information management. 
Workforce best practices comprise a third enabling factor in SoS acquisition. 
Identifying, recruiting, and retaining the most appropriate personnel for any SoS 
acquisition effort can substantially impact the effort’s process and outcomes. 
However, identifying best practices in this attribute is particularly difficult for two 
reasons. First, human inputs are unpredictable. In the case of Harvest HAWK, 
replacing a single engineer rescued the program from a months-long logjam when 
the new engineer identified an error in a sub-system’s code that had been inhibiting 
the proper function of the system-of-systems. Second, workforce is a complex 
system in itself; technical and programmatic personnel interact with one another at 
different levels with unpredictable impacts.  
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Analysis of the case studies indicates one best practice in the workforce 
attribute is to balance programmatic and technical personnel based on the specific 
needs of a program. At the enterprise level, the ideal workforce is weighted toward 
programmatic workers with some technical personnel available to provide 
overarching direction. At the systems level, technical personnel are more prevalent 
in the ideal workforce. Weighting toward technical personnel rather than 
programmatic personnel allows the workforce to avoid parochial interests and 
provide metrics-based assessments of progress toward a sub-system’s 
development.  
Incorporating recent and one-time end-users into the workforce is an 
additional best practice that enhances the alignment of outputs with the need they 
are expected to satisfy. The Deepwater family of vessels has been incorporating this 
best practice into its efforts to acquire the vessels formerly comprising that system-
of-systems. The presence of decision-makers with recent field experience in the 
Harvest HAWK initiative also contributed to that program’s success in producing an 
effective system-of-systems to meet an urgent operational need on the part of the 
Marine Corps for close air support. 
Regarding the incentive structure of an acquisition effort, analysis indicates 
fostering and satisfying greater mission commitment among stakeholders is an ideal 
motivator. Although mission commitment seems intangible and difficult to effect, the 
case studies highlight different ways to enhance the commitment of personnel 
throughout an acquisition effort’s hierarchy to the effort’s values and desired end-
state. For example, having strong budgetary advocates at the executive level 
communicates to stakeholders that their work in the acquisition of a system-of-
systems is valuable to the end-user and to the organization as a whole. Analysis 
indicates that personnel management tools can provide additional incentives. For 
example, as shown in the Deepwater case, the strategic appointment of 
accomplished personnel to leadership positions can inspire confidence throughout a 
program. Similarly, accountability at each level of the personnel hierarchy provides a 
disincentive to poor performance. 
Case study analysis also illustrates that acquisition managers can influence 
an effort’s success through incentives aimed at other systems and organizations. 
Most notably, high barriers to the entry of new technologies into an acquisition effort 
act as a disincentive to mid-stream innovation and damage the long-term 
effectiveness of a system-of-systems. The Harvest HAWK case offers several 
examples of barriers to entry and their impact on an effort’s process and outcomes. 
At the front end, the Marine Corps did not conduct a competition for source selection 
on the Harvest HAWK contract. Challenges that emerged later in the development 
process may have surfaced sooner if competitive offerings had been evaluated. In 
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contrast with this situation, lower barriers to entry of competitive and more recent 
technologies in DCGS facilitated the emergence of a competitive database solution 
that ultimately improved the operability of the entire system-of-systems.  
These best practices above represent ways to structure a complex acquisition 
effort to improve effectiveness and efficiency based on seven of the eight attributes 
analyzed. Identifying best practices in risk assessment, the final attribute, presents 
two significant challenges. First, risk is an inherent and unavoidable aspect of 
complexity. In addition to uncertainties originating in the development and 
procurement of individual systems, the interactions between and among those 
systems also creates potential areas of risk. Second, risks emerge in different 
stages of any given project in ways that cannot be predicted, complicating the 
universal application of best practices. For example, the Army’s approach to FCS 
exhibited greater risks in the early stages of system development. The effort was 
particularly risky in its requirements generation processes, which led to the selection 
of immature and untested technologies. Conversely, Harvest HAWK was non-
developmental by default and requirements in the early stages of that acquisition 
were less risky. It would appear that Harvest HAWK has adopted this as a best 
practice to reduce and manage risk. In fact, risks were just displaced elsewhere. 
They emerged when the Marine Corps began piecing existing systems together and 
creating new interactions for which the sub-systems had not been designed. 
Difficulties aside, analysis indicates best practices for the management and 
assessment of risk exist, but they should be evaluated for their fit with the specific 
objectives and challenges of an SoS acquisition effort and its unique sub-systems 
and interactions.  
Conclusions 
Complexity in defense acquisitions has emerged over time due to several 
changes in the warfighter’s needs. On the demand side, end-users face varied and 
quickly evolving threats that require constant innovations in materiel and weapons 
systems. On the supply side, technology development in the private sector and even 
among user communities often outpaces DoD-led acquisition projects. SoS 
acquisition is a challenging undertaking, but research and analysis supports this 
study’s premise that SoS approaches performed effectively help the defense 
community ensure interoperability and obtain technologies at the bleeding edge of 
the innovation curve.  
The trend towards more quickly evolving threats and greater industry- and 
user-led innovation is not likely to slow. In fact, it is likely to accelerate as the means 
of innovation become more readily accessible, especially for warfighters innovating 
their own solutions. As the internal complexity of defense acquisitions grows, and 
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the interactions of systems-of-systems with other platforms become more numerous 
and critical, best practices such as those outlined in this report will become 
increasingly important. 
This paper argued that it is particularly critical for the defense acquisition 
community to incorporate best practices in three governance attributes in particular. 
Acquirers should find the right balance of enterprise-level organizational focus and 
program-level technology awareness. In order to accomplish this balance, they must 
delegate decision-making across their organizations and maintain close managing 
relationships between oversight entities at the enterprise level, and their technical 
program components at the capabilities level. Enterprise-level oversight entities 
must maintain close managing relationships with their capability-level technical 
entities in order for a complex acquisition effort to succeed within human capital 
restrictions and with fewer cost and schedule issues.  
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